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Executive Summary 
Existing demand-pull measures, namely carbon pricing and the Renewables Directive, will be insufficient to deliver an 
adequate and timely level of private RD&D in new clean energy technologies. Thus, in order to reach the EU 2020 and 2050 
climate objectives, there is a need for direct public support to innovation. Public funds need to be spent wisely, given their 
limited availability. This report contributes a discussion on (i) how to build a balanced portfolio of RD&D projects; (ii) how 
to choose among financing instruments; and (iii) how to design public support to minimize the risk of ‘funding failure’.
In Chapter 2, we discuss the design of the optimal portfolio of existing and new low-carbon technologies given limited 
public funds. A balanced portfolio of research, development and demonstration (RD&D) is needed to accelerate the com-
mercialization of more mature technologies that have a large expected potential while, at the same time, adopting a persis-
tent research strategy to develop immature technologies. Project selection should be based on the expected reduction in 
CO2 emissions over the relevant time horizon per euro spent. Pursuing competitive parallel projects is desirable when each 
has a low probability of success but a sufficient expected value, while where the probability of success is high, funds should 
be more concentrated and competition among alternative research paths becomes less relevant. Cooperation among inno-
vators (with possible competition among consortia) facilitates high-cost projects and avoids costly duplication of RD&D. 
Cooperation and coordination among Member State and EU support policies need to be improved.
Chapter 3 discusses the rationale for the use of technology-push instruments as well as the optimal choice among these 
financing instruments to support pre-deployment innovation. Conventional subsidies in the form of grants and contracts 
should only be awarded to socially desirable innovation that will not be undertaken otherwise – they are an instrument 
of last resort when all else fails, but may well be needed for immature low-carbon technologies. Alternative, less costly, 
financing instruments (i.e. public loans and loan guarantees, public equity, technology prices, or benefits related to RD&D 
investments) are able to meet the support needs of certain types of innovation. Support needs of innovation, thereby, are 
related to the funding gap to be covered by the public sector, the potential needs to target a particular technology, the level 
of flexibility required in (re-) directing funds to alternative innovation projects, and/or being suited to supporting certain 
types of innovating entity.
Chapter 4 addresses the design of the support and release of public funds, including the assessment of performance of 
both projects and funding support. Financing instruments need to be implemented in a way that encourages efficiency 
while not discouraging participation by the private sector. If possible, public funds should be allocated by competition, 
providing incentives for efficiency in RD&D and to reduce the role of the public sector in ‘picking winners’. Public funding 
should be output-driven unless this deters innovators from undertaking the project, making the release of funds condi-
tional on performance. Project progress needs to be monitored using carefully designed Key Performance Indicators. The 
institutions set up to allocate funds to clean energy RD&D should be lean and flexible enough to avoid institutional inertia 
and lock-in. 
In Chapter 5, we present selected case studies, representing three different types of innovation processes. They demon-
strate the criteria guiding the selection of the corresponding innovation projects, the allocation of funds to them, the 
burden sharing among stakeholders, and the design of public support.
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes and provides recommendations. 
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Introduction
If the EU is to meet its 2050 climate objectives, the 
future energy mix will have to rely on a significantly 
increased share of low-carbon (low-C) generation 
technologies, much of which is not yet competitive 
(nor even technically proven). All sectors including 
energy, transportation, energy-intensive industries 
and agriculture will have to contribute to the neces-
sary reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. A diverse 
portfolio of clean technologies has to be employed at 
a large scale and investments enhancing energy effi-
ciency are needed. Substantial additional RD&D ac-
tivities are required in order to achieve the ambitious 
target of limiting global warming to a maximum of 
two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels and 
cut emissions by 80% or more for industrialized 
countries (see also Stern, 2006; Allen et al., 2009; IEA, 
2010). Substantial policy actions are also required 
(Jones and Glachant, 2010).
Research intensity in energy is low by comparison 
with many other sectors,1 and in the past was heav-
ily oriented towards nuclear fission and fusion, with 
very modest amounts spent on other low-C tech-
nologies. At present a surprisingly high 70% of non-
nuclear energy R&D in the EU is private, and of the 
30% that is public, 80% is provided by Member States 
and only 20% by the EU, or 6% of the total €3 billion 
spent annually – less than €200 million/yr (see Fig-
ure 1). While Member States roughly maintained the 
real level of RD&D investments spent on non-nuclear 
energy at around €(2007) 1.5 billion/yr, expenditures 
in nuclear technologies fell from nearly €(2007) 4 
billion/yr in 1985 to less than €(2007) 1 billion/yr in 
2007 (see Figure 3 in the Annex). France, Germany, 
1 Whereas the R&D-to-sales ratio for the energy sector 
lies with 1.5% clearly below the industrial average of 4.2%, sectors 
such as the software or health industries show values well above 
10% (Jaruzelski et al., 2005).
Italy and the UK accounted for three-quarters of the 
EU total.2 
Several points emerge from Figure 1. The example of 
nuclear fusion shows that there is no private funding, 
and public funding is shared almost equally between 
the EU and Member States, as no company believes 
that it will be commercial in anything but the distant 
future and the cost of the ITER experiment is so large 
as to dwarf what individual MS are willing to pay. 
To that extent it is an excellent model of an agreed 
collaborative form of co-funding a public good. In 
contrast the high level of private RD&D in hydrogen 
and fuel cells (FC) is largely driven by the automobile 
industry, whose large global companies and research 
intensity greatly exceed that of the electricity indus-
try. 
Research intensity in the electricity sector collapsed 
with the privatization and liberalization of electricity 
markets. It is clearly easier to support risky R&D un-
der state monopoly ownership (or regulated private 
franchise monopolies, as in the US before liberaliza-
tion) as the costs can be passed through to captive 
consumers without explicit state funding. It is also 
easier to justify charging consumers for R&D that is 
directed to reducing the cost of future electricity sup-
ply within the country than for R&D that is directed 
to reducing global carbon emissions that will primar-
ily benefit the rest of the world. 
However, substantial additional investments are re-
2 See EC (2009d), IZT & Frost and Sullivan (2006), and 
the IEA Energy Technology R&D Statistics (http://www.iea.org/
stats/rd.asp) for detailed information on RD&D investments in 
low-C technologies. Different Member States emphasized differ-
ent clean energy technologies. Figure 4 in Annex A shows that 
while France, and to some extent also Italy, spent more which 
might be expected by the size of their electricity sector, Germany 
and even more so the UK spent less. Relatively speaking, Den-
mark made the highest contribution per kWh of either genera-
tion or consumption.
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quired in order to approach to the ambitious two-
degree target. The financing gap between recent ex-
penditures and those needed to finance innovations 
in key technologies as identified in the Strategic En-
ergy Technology Plan (SET Plan) amounts to €47 to 
60 billion (EC, 2009c). Annex B provides more infor-
mation on the current financing arrangements of In-
dustrial Initiatives. For reasons discussed below it is 
most unlikely that the current high private share can 
be sustained at near treble the scale, and additional 
sources of public funding will likely be required. 
Does an adequate portfolio of existing and new clean 
energy technologies develop spontaneously? There 
are several reasons for doubting this. Reducing CO2 
emissions is a global public good, and unless these re-
ductions are adequately rewarded, or the damaging 
emissions properly charged, the incentive to develop 
low-C technologies will be too low. Hence, private in-
novators’ RD&D activities in low-C energy technolo-
gies rely on the future willingness of governments to 
impose a charge on CO2 emissions. In the absence of 
any other market failure, a credible and appropriate 
carbon price should provide sufficient incentives for 
innovators to invest in RD&D of new clean energy 
technologies. However, the implemented EU emis-
sion trading scheme provides neither a sufficiently 
high current price nor a credible and adequate future 
carbon price (see also Aghion et al., 2009). 
Even if this set of problems were overcome, there 
remain critically important market failures, some of 
which apply to many forms of private R&D, and some 
of which are more specific to low-C R&D.3 These in-
clude the standard problem with R&D (i) that without 
any further support, innovating firms cannot fully ap-
propriate the returns from their RD&D activities due 
to existing social, market and/or network spillovers. 
In addition, (ii) innovations in clean energy tech-
nologies often pair very high capital requirements 
with substantial economic, technical and regulatory 
uncertainties, which hampers access to finance; (iii) 
past R&D and learning economies enjoyed by exist-
ing energy technologies make it harder for new tech-
nologies to achieve unit cost levels at which they can 
compete in the market; particularly as companies 
3 Jaffe (1996) gives an excellent account of various mar-
ket and technological spillovers arising from private innovation 
activities. Martin and Scott (2000) and Foxon (2003) discuss mar-
ket failures of low-C innovation. For an overview on theoretical 
analyses of the effects of environmental policy on technological 
change see Jaffe et al. (2002). For a detailed discussion on the 
funding gap in the financing of R&D and innovation originating 
in imperfections of financial markets see Hall and Lerner (2009). 
Figure 1. Investments in RD&D in low-carbon technologies (2007 data) - Source: EC (2009c)
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tend to focus on innovations which are expected to 
lead to more rapid pay-offs whereas the optimal port-
folio has a 2050 (or even longer) time horizon; and, 
finally, (iv) there is a tension to resolve between the 
need to encourage private sector R&D, which compa-
nies argue requires strong enforcement of intellectual 
property rights (IPR), with the desire to make the re-
sulting discoveries as widely available as possible in 
developing countries so that they can be deployed at 
scale. 
Without further public support, the level and tim-
ing of private investments in the development of new 
clean energy technologies will be socially subopti-
mal. These market failures encourage private inven-
tors and investors focusing on projects that pay off 
in the near term, whereas the optimal portfolio has a 
considerably longer time horizon – certainly looking 
ahead to the 2050 target. While the potential market 
for low-C energy is huge, the margins to be earned, 
even with an adequate carbon price, will likely be 
modest, as energy prices are limited by existing well-
developed fossil options. Consequently public sup-
port will be far more important than for other types 
of R&D, such as in the pharmaceuticals sector, that 
meets new needs or creates products for which there 
are no close substitutes. 
Although the EU’s contribution to energy RD&D is 
modest, it can play a number of important roles. In 
particular, EU funding can encourage a coordinated 
increase in Member State’s low-C energy research in 
promising areas; support high risk, high cost, long-
term programmes that would be challenging even 
for the larger Member States; encourage cross-border 
partnerships to transfer skills from stronger to weaker 
partners; play a strategic role in rebalancing the port-
folio of projects to offset any tendency that Member 
States might have to concentrate on a subset of more 
immediately prospective innovations; encourage the 
wider dissemination of RD&D; and, finally, may cre-
ate a more credible future funding environment by 
requiring joint agreements that take precedence over 
domestic funding allocations. 
This report is the first in a series written under the 
EU FP7 project THINK. Its aim is to guide European 
energy policy makers in the framing and implemen-
tation of the SET Plan objectives, i.e. raising the level 
of RD&D in identified key technologies to deliver the 
highest social benefit given the inevitable constraints 
on funding. We focus on pre-deployment innovation, 
namely research, development and demonstration 
activities that need direct public support (i.e. technol-
ogy-push rather than market-pull instruments) and 
belong to the highly risky stages of the innovation 
chain. This report does not discuss possible sources 
of the public funds required to meet the SET Plan ob-
jectives as these will be addressed in Topic 4 within 
the THINK project.4
In Chapter 2, we discuss the design of the optimal 
portfolio of existing and new low-C technologies 
taking account of the limited public funds avail-
able. Chapter 3 discusses the rationale for the use of 
technology-push instruments as well as the optimal 
choice among these financing policy instruments. 
Chapter 4 addresses the design of the release of public 
funds, as well as the performance assessment of tech-
nologies, innovation projects and funding support 
provided. In Chapter 5, we present selected case stud-
ies to illustrate the application of principles derived 
in Chapters 1-4. Finally, we provide conclusions and 
policy recommendations in Chapter 6. 
4 Topic 4 will discuss the impact of EU climate policies 
on the public budget of Member States taking into account all 
three pillars of EU climate policy, namely carbon pricing, the Re-
newables Directive, and the SET Plan.
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1. Building the portfolio of RD&D 
projects to support the SET Plan
This chapter addresses the selection of projects build-
ing the optimal portfolio of RD&D activities in low-C 
technologies supporting the achievement of EU 2020 
and 2050 climate objectives. Section 2.1 provides 
background information on the SET Plan; Section 
2.2 discusses the trade-off between collaboration and 
competition in RD&D; Section 2.3 highlights the ma-
jor factors determining the potential social returns of 
innovation projects; Section 2.4 provides a guide to 
project selection in the framework of the SET Plan; 
and finally, Section 2.5 addresses the issue of coordi-
nation of support policies among the EU and Mem-
ber States.
1.1 The SET Plan
The EU’s SET Plan is a response to the evident need 
to stimulate research and development in low-C tech-
nologies. The Plan covers eight Industrial Initiatives 
corresponding to eight technologies (or technol-
ogy fields) identified as key to a future clean energy 
technology mix required to meet the 2050 climate 
targets.5 Within these Initiatives, strategic objectives 
have been formulated based on Technology Road-
maps that identify priority actions for the next dec-
ade (2010 to 2020). More specific Implementation 
Plans are developed for three-year periods (starting 
with the first period running from 2010-2012). These 
Plans contain more detailed descriptions of proposed 
RD&D activities, as well as suggestions on potential 
5 See Annex C for an overview on SET Plan technolo-
gies (i.e. wind, solar PV/CSP, electricity grids, bio-energy, CCS, 
nuclear fission, smart cities and hydrogen/FC). A preliminary al-
location of funds in the nearer-term to the designated technolo-
gies has been provided by the EC applying four selection criteria: 
EU added value, the willingness of actors to joint forces, potential 
market penetration of the technology in different time horizons, 
and its potential contribution to CO2 reduction, security of en-
ergy supply, and competitiveness.
funding sources.6 Authorities estimated a financing 
gap of €47-60 bn over the decade, comparing the cur-
rent level of expenditures with that necessary to de-
liver the priority actions (see Table 1). Given the size 
of this financing gap, substantial additional funds will 
be required and projects prioritised, given the pos-
sible shortfall facing EU funds.
The SET Plan also distinguishes among different de-
grees of maturity of technologies; with Group 1 be-
ing close to market competitiveness with an expected 
mass market deployment in the short- to medium 
term (2010-2020), Group 2 comprises emerging tech-
nologies expected to become cost competitive be-
tween 2020 and 2035, while Group 3 consists of new 
technologies that are immature and not expected to 
become competitive before 2035. The relative impor-
tance of demand-pull to technology-push decreases 
as one moves from Group 1 to 3, and so EU-funding 
through the SET Plan will be primarily targeted at 
Groups 2 and 3.
As both EU and Member State public funds are lim-
ited, the main criterion for allocating these funds is 
to maximize the resulting social benefits, leveraging 
first MS public funds and ultimately private sector 
contributions. There are good reasons for making 
an initial allocation of funds to each sector, as com-
parisons across sectors are likely to be more difficult 
than across projects within sectors. As experience in 
project evaluation accumulates and confidence in the 
quality and predictive power of these evaluations im-
proves, it will be possible to reallocate funds between 
sectors, from those with lower pay-offs to those with 
more promise.
The SET Plan puts strong emphasis on joint strate-
6 Currently, the time lag between a call for proposals and 
the start of a project may be up to a year and a half, and will need 
to be reduced to accelerate innovation.
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gic planning and a more effective implementation 
of programs, since the analysis of the public spend-
ing under the EU FP6 clearly demonstrated a lack of 
transnational cooperation (EC, 2009c). Johnstone et 
al. (2010) find evidence that public environmental 
policies have had a very significant influence on de-
veloping renewable technologies, with different sup-
port schemes having different impacts depending on 
the stage of maturity of the technology. In addition 
to Member States public support, there is additional 
evidence that EU co-funding and collaboration will 
enhance the pay-off to R&D. Verdolini and Galleot-
ti (2009) show empirically that energy R&D in one 
country produces beneficial spillovers to neighboring 
countries, and these effects are larger, the closer geo-
graphically, economically and socially the neighbors 
are. The EU fits these requirements admirably, and 
has the economic scale to make a substantial impact if 
Member States recognize the joint advantages of col-
laboration. Their findings are questioned to some ex-
tent by Braun et al. (2010) who find that energy R&D 
spillovers are primarily a domestic phenomenon (and 
international spillovers play a negligible role, which is 
of particular concern as developing countries are in-
creasingly important contributors to CO2 emissions). 
However, they also acknowledge important benefits 
of coordination concluding that “coordination of 
R&D efforts, priorities, and the exchange of failure 
and success stories could avoid […] duplication and, 
moreover, accelerate overall technological progress.” 
The SET Plan thus justifiably has coordination as one 
of its central objectives.
1.2 Collaborative RD&D or competing 
parallel projects?
The arguments for implementing cooperation rather 
than competition seem compelling – if many firms 
cooperate in a single RD&D joint venture they can 
better capture knowledge spillovers, reduce duplica-
tion, exploit economies of scale, and thus accelerate 
commercialization. The danger is that by agreeing on 
a single strategy they foreclose other options and re-
duce creative diversity. Evidence from various US pro-
grammes aimed at industrial collaboration suggests 
that they tended to concentrate on low-risk short-
term projects as the ones most likely to be widely sup-
ported by the consortium, and avoided investigating 
disruptive technologies (e.g. fuel cells for vehicles) 
that would threaten existing market strengths. 
At a theoretical level, Annex D shows some of the 
trade-offs between collaborative and competitive re-
search in a very simple model. In allocating funds, the 
Table 1. Current funding and estimated financing needs for key SET Plan technologies [€ mn/yr average]
Sector Public EU current Yearly total current SET Plan resources needed
Hydrogen and fuel cells  70 620 500
Wind 11 380 550
Solar (PV and CSP) 32 470 1,600
Bio-energy 13 350 850
Smart grids 14 270 200
Carbon capture, transport and storage 17 290 1,050-1,650
Nuclear fusion 204 485 Under ITER?
Sustainable nuclear Generation IV 5 460 500-1,000
Smart cities n.a. n.a. 1,000-1,200
Total 366 3,325 6,250-7,550
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funder can choose between concentrating resources 
on a single or very small number of projects, or diver-
sifying by funding parallel projects following differ-
ent strategies, with independent chances of success. 
As the probability of success increases, funds should 
be more concentrated. On the other hand, high-risk 
projects with a low chance of success (but a suffi-
ciently high pay-off if successful) warrant increasing 
the number of parallel projects. In choosing between 
sectors where the expected benefits are the same, it 
seems preferable to bias funds towards riskier pro-
jects with the same expected return. 
This is consistent with the empirical evidence: “one of 
the historic strengths of US science and technology 
policies has been their ability to accommodate un-
certainty. Federal agencies have often supported mul-
tiple, competing technology pathways. In contrast, 
where government has sought to define technical at-
tributes or design features and ‘pick winners’ in the 
marketplace, failure has been a common outcome” 
(Alic et al., 2003, p. 11).7
1.3 Estimating the potential social 
returns to a project
Factors determining the future social benefits of in-
novation include the rate of penetration of the cor-
responding technology, the size of the market, its reli-
ability and the reduction in emissions and operation 
costs that it is expected to achieve, which, with the po-
tential capital and operation costs determine the po-
7 The breeder reactor programme, discussed in Cohen 
and Noll (1991), is a paradigmatic example of the limitations of 
the public sector to efficiently conduct innovation and identify 
winning technologies. This programme was the major focus of 
US federal RD&D activity from the early 1960s until the cancella-
tion of its demonstration in 1983. Authorities persistently overes-
timated demand and underestimated the required cost of the de-
velopment of the technology. When costs exploded, the industry 
left the project and the federal government took complete control 
committing further amounts of public funds presumably driven 
by political considerations rather than socio-economic ones.
tential future benefits of this innovation. The ultimate 
market size will be determined by the resource base 
and unit costs for this technology. Thus, the global re-
source base for concentrated solar power is huge (in 
terms of TWh of insolation), but the market is lim-
ited by the hours of sunlight (daily and seasonally) 
and the distance of prime sites from demand centres 
(North Africa being an attractive location in terms 
of W/m2 but distant from major demand centres). 
Wind is limited by wind speed (in the UK to perhaps 
an average in good on-shore locations of 2 MW/km2) 
and the land take required. The land take for biomass 
is even more of a constraint while tidal stream has a 
limited resource base. Reasonable estimates are avail-
able for most technologies, although there is consid-
erable uncertainty about some constraints, for exam-
ple the location and size of reservoirs for storing CO2.
The potential cost advantage is more difficult to deter-
mine, as it will depend in large part on relative rates 
of learning-by-doing and the ultimate physical con-
straints in terms of material requirements and ther-
modynamics. The importance of relative, rather than 
absolute, rates of cost reduction is often ignored – the 
early forecasts of the competitiveness of the British 
nuclear programme were predicated on an unchang-
ing thermal efficiency of coal-fired power stations. In 
fact they were experiencing steady and cumulatively 
substantial improvements as turbine size rose from 
60 to 660 MW units, undercutting any cost reduc-
tions in nuclear power. 
Annex E works through an example to illustrate the 
relative importance of the various factors that will in-
fluence the social returns to an R&D project, high-
lighting the considerable uncertainty about almost all 
the relevant factors. If the R&D project is successful, 
it should lower the costs of some specified clean tech-
nology. The projected rate of capacity expansion of 
this technology turns out to be critical not only in de-
http://think.eui.eu 7
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termining the future market size and hence future so-
cial value, but also in driving the pace of cost reduc-
tion through learning-by-doing, and hence the date 
at which the technology no longer needs subsidy. This 
should not be surprising, as the power of compound 
growth over long periods is enormous, and hence so 
is the projected future size of the market for the tech-
nology. Some reality checks on ultimate market pen-
etration are therefore clearly needed. 
Learning rates are important for determining to-
tal support costs and the date of commercialization, 
but higher learning rates lower the value of a current 
R&D project that lowers costs today, assuming that 
the resulting cost reductions lead to a lower cost base 
to which these learning effects are applied. Another 
way of putting the same point is that a given percent 
reduction in the initial cost as a result of the R&D 
project translates into a shorter period of time gained 
when exogenous learning rates are higher, and hence 
is worth less. 
Discount rates have a predictably large effect on pre-
sent values. So do diffusion rates, suggesting that pol-
icies addressing intellectual property will be impor-
tant. Finally, the project success rate, whether it will 
penetrate the global market, and whether it creates an 
enduring improvement that can be built on, all have 
powerful effects on its value, as does the generosity 
with which global rather than EU benefits are valued 
and counted.
Ofgem’s Low Carbon Development Fund (Ofgem, 
2010) sets out a useful set of criteria for selecting pro-
jects to be supported by funds that it controls (that 
have been collected from electricity consumers). The 
projects should (i) accelerate the development of a 
low-C energy sector; (ii) create new knowledge that 
can be shared by the relevant users; (iii) have the po-
tential to deliver net benefits to existing and/or future 
consumers; and (iv) would not otherwise be adopted 
on commercial grounds. The SET Plan has wider am-
bitions than just delivering benefits to the electricity 
customers, but the principles are still valid.
1.4 Guide to the selection of projects 
within the SET Plan
1.4.1 Background
As highlighted above, the SET Plan contains eight 
Industrial Initiatives corresponding to eight promis-
ing low-C technologies. The SET Plan does not ap-
pear to have selected technologies, research paths and 
priority actions on the basis of cost-benefit analyses, 
making it difficult to prioritise if there is a short-fall 
in the funds forthcoming. Not surprisingly, given the 
current financial crisis, several Industrial Initiatives 
are encountering great difficulties in raising the sums 
needed to fund priority projects. Moreover, current 
European clean innovation policy seems tilted in fa-
vour of developing near-market technologies by large 
incumbent companies. Thus, tools like the Frame-
work Programme, which were initially intended to 
support R&D, are now hosting an increasing amount 
of demonstration projects. All this confirms the need 
for a sound framework for selecting priority SET Plan 
actions. 
This will require evaluating the different technologies’ 
potentials and choosing suitable Key Performance In-
dicators (KPIs). As there is considerable uncertainty 
about the most cost-effective clean technologies over 
the period to 2050, it will be necessary to pursue a 
variety of research paths. As more information about 
their potential becomes available, some technologies 
may be abandoned and resources concentrated on a 
narrower range of options.
In many cases, particularly where it is not clear what 
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research strategy will deliver the required break-
through or learning, it will make sense to pursue a 
number of parallel RD&D projects all directed to 
achieving the objective of the corresponding prior-
ity action, as described in Section 2.2 and Annex D. 
The expected value of any single project will be de-
termined by its value if successful, V, per euro spent, 
and the probability of success, p, each of which are 
key determinants of the optimal portfolio. Compar-
ing across technologies, some may have a high value 
per euro spent if successful but a low chance of suc-
cess, while others may be more likely to succeed but 
deliver a lower value per euro spent if successful, pos-
sibly with the same expected value pV. The optimal 
number of parallel projects will increase as the prob-
ability of success of any of them decreases, holding 
constant the expected value, pV. For each priority 
action, its cost and probability of overall success will 
depend on the number of projects undertaken in par-
allel, and it is the optimal portfolio of parallel projects 
that should be considered when comparing options 
within and across technologies. 
1.4.2 Project selection process
Priority actions to be funded should be selected at 
the beginning of each three-year period correspond-
ing to new Implementation Plans, or more frequently 
if funds are to be reallocated within that period. The 
three steps to be followed within this selection pro-
cess include (i) estimating the funds available, (ii) as-
sessing the expected value of alternative projects, and, 
finally, (iii) selecting the portfolio of projects consid-
ering both mid-term (2020) and longer-term (2050) 
climate objectives.
The first step involves making a reliable estimate of 
the funds available over the planning period (i.e. 
three years).8 The degree of flexibility in (re-)allocat-
ing funds in response to the level of achievement of 
KPIs may be constrained by funding sources, partic-
ularly those from private companies with more nar-
rowly focused interests and expertise. That is where 
the careful prior elaboration of the conditions under 
which public co-funding takes place is important.
In a second step, the expected value of alternative 
projects must be assessed based on a single evalua-
tion criterion. The natural objective is to maximize 
the overall lifetime contribution of projects funded to 
GHG reductions given the limited funds available.9 
Thus, we are assuming that the benefits produced by a 
project (its value) correspond to the size of the reduc-
tion in CO2 emissions it is expected to produce in the 
relevant time horizons compared to not adopting that 
option (and perhaps waiting for a more promising fu-
ture project). The size of emission reductions caused 
by a project, in turn, depends on the contribution of 
this project to the development of new technological 
options, which can be assessed in terms of the time 
at which these options reach the deployment stage 
if successful, their probability of success, and the 
reduction in emissions that would result from their 
deployment. Prospective emission reductions in turn 
depend on the expected extra system costs associated 
with this technology per tonne of CO2 it saves com-
pared with those of competing technologies, as that 
8 In some cases longer term funding commitments may 
be available, where the funds can be sequenced over successive 
three-year periods, while if possible preserving the option of real-
locating funds within and between technologies as information 
about the expected returns to further RD&D is gathered.
9  There is an interesting question about whether the CO2 
reductions should be discounted, and if so at what discount rate, 
but as a first approximation, as the damage done per tonne of CO2 
is rising at the rate of interest (at least until atmospheric CO2 con-
centrations stabilize), discounting the damage avoided is equiva-
lent to summing the total CO2 reductions over the relevant time 
period (e.g. until 2050). Obviously projects should be compared 
over the same time periods, and it may give assurance to have the 
totals available up to intermediate dates, as nearer term projec-
tions are likely to be more reliable.
http://think.eui.eu 9
Public Support for the Financing of RD&D Activities in New Clean Energy Technologies
will affect the size of market penetration achieved, 
and the rate at which it is deployed. 
System costs caused by a technology include both di-
rect and indirect costs, such as the extra reserves or 
storage required to achieve the desired level of secu-
rity of supply in the system as a consequence of the 
deployment of the technology. These depend, among 
other things, on the reliability, availability and inter-
mittency levels of the newly deployed technology.
Estimating the contribution of a project to the devel-
opment of new technologies and the expected contri-
bution of the latter to the reduction in CO2 emissions 
to 2020 and, especially to 2050, may be challeng-
ing. This amounts to comparing the consequences 
for emissions reductions if this project is successful 
against the counterfactual, in which the project is not 
undertaken, but the rest of the world carries on as be-
fore (and the rest of the world will also be undertaking 
RD&D, and pursuing climate strategies that are likely 
to induce innovation elsewhere). One of the hardest 
parts to assess is whether a successful outcome for 
a particular project will influence the starting point 
from which all future technology developments take 
place. If so then its leverage may be enormous, but 
if it merely accelerates developments that would oth-
erwise have happened slightly later, then its value is 
clearly lower. The critical, and challenging part of the 
evaluation, is therefore to determine what the addi-
tional benefit of this project is, over and above every-
thing else that is also going on to reduce emissions.10 
However, estimating the relative size of CO2 emission 
reductions per euro spent from different technolo-
10 Annex E illustrates some of the steps and the issues 
that have to be addressed for a very stylized case of PV RD&D 
(which could usefully be updated with more reliable informa-
tion). Similar exemplary illustrative calculations could usefully 
be undertaken for other technologies as a first step in providing 
the information needed to better allocate the scarce public RD&D 
funds.
gies may be easier than computing the absolute value 
of these reductions. That may be sufficient to guide 
funding allocations across technologies and between 
different priority actions.
Finally, the third step involves the proper selection of 
projects to be undertaken. Projects should be ranked 
in terms of their expected additional contribution to 
cumulative CO2 reductions over the period to 2020 
and, with less confidence, up to 2050. The case for in-
termediate targets such as 2020 is strengthened as it 
gives urgency to, and is a means of monitoring, Mem-
ber State contributions to longer term targets. Obvi-
ously, projects focused on achieving 2020 policy ob-
jectives are likely (if the corresponding technologies 
remain competitive) to help achieve 2050 targets, but 
an over-emphasis on near-term delivery goes against 
the grain of the SET Plan, which is to compensate for 
a failure to fund projects that only deliver over longer 
time periods. The purpose of the SET Plan is to sup-
plement the near-market support mechanisms pro-
vided through the 2020 Renewables Directive with 
support for promising but less mature technologies. 
1.5 Coordination of EU and Member 
State support
If the EU is to encourage Member States and the in-
dustry to support innovation in immature technolo-
gies, the careful design of the institutional framework, 
including the relevant regulatory and legal frame-
work, will be critical to success. This section discusses 
ways of coordinating EU and Member State support 
policies and the criteria for determining burden shar-
ing among stakeholders.
1.5.1 Joint programming or the EU as a ‘re-
sidual’ funder?
Member States can provide direct funding in a decen-
http://think.eui.eu10
Final Report - January 2011
tralized manner, or alternatively, the European Union 
can do this in a centralized one in collaboration with 
Member States by pooling funds. Cooperation among 
Member States is preferable whenever the common 
interest is larger than the sum of the individual states’ 
interests (Lévêque et al., 2010). 
There are two main coordination strategies between 
national and EU funding. In the first, priority actions 
(and their associated projects) would be jointly cho-
sen by the Commission and Member States according 
to a framework of the type provided in Section 2.4. 
This will require decisions on: 
(i) The fraction of the estimated project cost covered 
from public funds. This should be large enough to 
engage innovators in the project. However, as ex-
plained in Section 3, public funding should aim 
to trigger private investments instead of replac-
ing them. In this regard, it is worth mentioning 
that non-energy businesses may make significant 
contributions to clean energy innovation funding 
if the right support is in place; e.g. IT companies 
may push innovation to develop highly energy ef-
ficient devices for their technology solutions.
(ii) National/European origin of public funds. Projects 
and calls for proposals can be financed by the EU or 
Member States alone or they can be funded joint-
ly by them. If Member States finance/co-finance 
a project, the subset of those contributing funds 
should also be defined and counted towards the 
overall burden sharing arrangements within the 
SET Plan. Criteria guiding burden sharing among 
stakeholders are listed in Section 2.5.2 below.
The second form of coordination accepts that Mem-
ber States will design their national research plans in-
dependently, but require them to provide a mapping 
of their proposed RD&D activities to the Commis-
sion. The EU would then aim to support those social-
ly valuable projects that have been left out of these na-
tional plans. In these cases, the Commission should 
carry out a “bounded” selection of socially valuable 
projects that deserve European public funding sup-
port but are not nationally planned, while encourag-
ing Member States to co-finance as many as possible, 
perhaps encouraging them to substitute funds for less 
socially beneficial national choices for a share of a 
larger and better co-funded project. 
The first and more ambitious strategy, also called 
Joint Programming, will result in a more efficient al-
location of funds for two main reasons: First, Joint 
Programming avoids costly duplication of similar 
projects conducted independently by several Mem-
ber States. This is more relevant the closer the innova-
tion to be funded is to the market, since later-stage in-
novation typically involves higher capital investments 
and competition among parallel technology options 
normally is not a priority in late innovation due to the 
higher success probabilities. Second, pooling part of 
the funds spent separately by countries within their 
plans would allow authorities to fund high cost im-
mature technologies that otherwise run the risk of 
not receiving enough support. Increasing the level of 
coordination among the support programmes of the 
different directorates and units within the EC would 
also increase the efficiency of this support.
Even when Joint Programming would be more effi-
cient, countries are unlikely to renounce their right to 
fund projects deemed crucial for their national inter-
ests. Thus any feasible scheme will probably involve 
the coexistence of Joint Programming with some 
weaker form of coordination. Even where coordina-
tion is limited, pooling Member State and EU inno-
vation funds may be necessary to finance high-cost 
projects. The initiation of European Energy Research 
Alliances – aimed at realizing pan-European RD&D 
by pooling and integrating activities and resources, 
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combining national and EU sources – is a step into 
the right direction. Their successful implementation 
should therefore be fostered and progress monitored. 
Designing a common EU/MS coordination strategy 
could take place at a cross-technology forum includ-
ing all Industrial Initiatives and, for each technology, 
in the regular Industrial Initiative meetings. The EU’s 
main task will be to amplify the impact of national 
research agendas by, for example, encouraging a pro-
gramme of simultaneous competing projects across 
Member States where this is suggested by a portfolio 
approach to cost-benefit analysis, and “buying” the 
sharing of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) among 
Member States (and possible non-Annex I countries).
1.5.2 Criteria determining the burden sharing 
among stakeholders
A number of criteria helping to determine the de-
sired level of involvement of the EU in the funding of 
a project are listed below:
— The level of funding provided by the EU should in 
general increase with the EU added value of the 
project. 
— Projects likely to produce long-term benefits to 
the EU as a whole tend not to be so appealing for 
individual Member States. The EU should help to 
fund these projects if they contribute to a more 
balanced future portfolio of technologies. The EU 
share of public funds could be large for cheaper 
innovations. 
— Funding high-risk, high-cost, projects that are 
deemed to produce benefits only in the long-term 
is normally challenging even for the largest Mem-
ber States. In this case, a contribution by the EU, 
even when marginal compared to total investment 
needs, could trigger further investments by Mem-
ber States and private investors and therefore pro-
mote the creation of large international funding 
consortiums (clubs of funders).
The level of involvement of the different countries in 
the funding of a project should depend on the global 
amount of financial resources they have available and 
their natural strengths and priorities.
2. Direct public support to RD&D 
in low-carbon technologies
This chapter deals with direct public support to 
RD&D in new clean technologies. Section 3.1 pro-
vides background information on the economic 
rational for public support; Section 3.2 introduces 
an analytical framework to be used when choosing 
among alternative support instruments. The way sup-
port is provided should be tailored to the relevant 
features of each innovation process (particularly their 
cost and level of maturity). Section 3.3 assesses the 
application of main available financing policy instru-
ments and provides conclusions on the adequate for-
mat of direct support for different types of innovation 
projects.
2.1 Rationale for public support 
Current levels of privately financed clean energy in-
novation will not be sufficient to deliver a mix of tech-
nologies able to meet EU climate objectives, and the 
required portfolio will not develop spontaneously. 
This section discusses the rationale for public support 
including the trade-off between the intellectual prop-
erty protection that provides incentives to innovate 
and knowledge dissemination; briefly summarizing 
the role of indirect public support to the deployment 
of clean technologies; and, finally, arguing the need 
for direct funding support. 
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2.1.1 Protection of intellectual property ver-
sus knowledge dissemination
Private companies undertake RD&D in order to 
obtain the rights to exploit their findings profitably. 
Where RD&D is entirely privately financed, intellec-
tual property rights (IPR) are the logical reward for 
success in producing knowledge that might readily be 
copied. In contrast, where RD&D is co-funded by the 
public sector, the public has an interest in the exploi-
tation of that knowledge, and there may be a conflict 
between maximizing the private (company) and so-
cial benefits of that knowledge. How public funders 
should treat any intellectual property (IP) developed 
in partnership or under co-funding will depend sen-
sitively on the nature of the IP, the objectives and 
position of the company, and the objectives of the 
funder. It is hard to make any simple generalizations 
in this report. We note, however, that the issue has 
to be addressed at a very early stage in any public-
private RD&D partnership to avoid possibly costly 
and extensive delays. Developing standard forms of 
contract might be a valuable activity in its own right 
that the EU might consider.
Reaching ambitious climate objectives requires the 
wide use of clean technologies, also in developing 
countries, as well as achieving a high enough rate 
of knowledge diffusion that allows building on this 
knowledge. However, most of the existing innova-
tion revenue appropriation mechanisms (including 
patents and secrecy) represent an obstacle to the free 
dissemination and use of knowledge produced.11 
Henry and Stiglitz (2010) discuss whether IPR, with 
11 The effectiveness of each of these mechanisms depends 
on the nature of innovation carried out as well as on the design 
of the mechanism itself. Whereas e.g. secrecy tends to be more 
effective to protect process innovation, patents are more effective 
at protecting product innovation (see Cohen et al., 2000; Levin et 
al., 1987). In addition, different mechanisms may have different 
impacts on the rate of knowledge dissemination and technology 
transfer. 
their increasingly global reach, furthers or hinders 
the production and dissemination of knowledge and 
the development of a sustainable economy. They ar-
gue that reforms in the intellectual property regime 
are necessary to increase the pace of innovation.
Authorities and funding institutions must aim to im-
plement effective mechanisms to encourage the par-
ticipation of private parties in innovation while deliv-
ering a high enough transfer of technology. Without 
a public requirement to make knowledge available 
and thus accelerate diffusion, there is a danger that 
innovators will attempt to delay such diffusion in or-
der to increase their own market revenues. The risk 
is that such public requirements might adversely 
weaken the private sector incentive to participate, not 
only in publicly funded projects, but also in compet-
ing parallel privately funded projects. In this case, 
publicly funded innovation would not complement 
but replace privately financed one, i.e. clean innova-
tion would end up being almost completely publicly 
financed and managed. This is clearly undesirable 
where innovation is more efficiently managed by the 
private sector (and whose potential commercial ap-
peal is high enough).
The UK Energy Technologies Institute (ETI, 2010) 
provides an interesting example of how to resolve this 
trade-off. The ETI has set up a flexible system to man-
age IP resulting from the RD&D activities it finances 
or co-finances. This IP (including patents) is normal-
ly owned and managed by a member of the research 
consortium. However, industrial members (funders) 
of ETI and programme associates have free access to 
it. Members of the research consortium may or may 
not have access to IP produced depending on their 
contribution to the project in terms of knowledge, 
own IP and their remuneration for participating in 
this project. Third parties do not have access to pro-
duced IP for a certain period (normally seven years); 
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hence, a sort of club of funders is created. After this 
exclusive access period, third party access to IP is 
provided subject to the payment of a limited royalty. 
Background IP owned by project participants that is 
deemed relevant to the project should be made avail-
able to the consortium on a free basis for the use in 
activities related to the project. 
IP schemes should normally reward innovators in 
proportion to the successful use of the technologies 
they helped develop. Hypothetically, clean energy IPR 
might provide geographical limitations on protected 
use. Thus, for example, patents issued could grant 
private entrepreneurs and companies exclusive rights 
that only apply to developed countries. Developing 
countries could be free to make use of the IPR for 
their domestic use, although there might need to be 
some system of royalty payments on exports to devel-
oped countries. Alternatively, a system of royalty pay-
ments could be created whereby the level of payments 
depends on the country where licensed technologies 
are used. Both a system of geographically differenti-
ated royalty payments and one of geographically lim-
ited patents should probably be complemented by a 
centrally administered fund compensating innova-
tors for foregone revenues in developing countries.
Another alternative could be to buy out IPR from 
successful innovators or entrepreneurs in order to 
provide open access to the IP. On the other hand, 
private companies might be willing to voluntarily re-
strict their IPR in exchange for up-front public sup-
port, effectively providing co-funding, possibly pro-
portionate to the predicted sales to countries granted 
open-access to the IPR.
Barton (2007) advances a contrary view, arguing that 
in most cases, mechanisms currently applied to ap-
propriate revenues from innovation are unlikely to 
represent a significant obstacle to the penetration and 
use of clean energy technologies in developing coun-
tries. Competition among global suppliers of new 
technologies will limit license prices or the prices of 
products sold by global clean-tech manufacturers. 
The prospects for the creation of leading clean-tech 
companies in developing countries with large re-
search capabilities vary depending on the technology 
considered, with China, and to some extent India, as 
the most likely successful entrants in wind and some 
other low-C technologies. Perhaps a more serious 
danger to the adoption of clean technologies in the 
developing world is the high concentration within 
the industry, which could lead to cartel behaviour 
by global manufacturers, and selective licensing and 
broad patents used by developed governments to pro-
tect local companies. It would be preferable if these 
governments concluded international agreements 
with developing countries to jointly develop clean 
technologies.
In the remainder of this report we assume that steps 
have been taken to make wide and rapid adoption of 
clean technologies and diffusion of knowledge com-
patible with the active involvement of private compa-
nies in RD&D activities, even when the latter need to 
be publicly co-funded.12
2.1.2 The role of support for deployment
Achieving a socially efficient level of market pen-
etration of clean technologies requires correcting 
the positive environmental externality they produce 
through an appropriate carbon-pricing scheme. The 
relative merits of different carbon pricing schemes are 
discussed in Grubb and Newbery (2007) or Goulder 
and Parry (2008). However, the correct level of car-
12 Wherever the mechanism chosen to protect private re-
turns from innovation involves the use of IP rights, implement-
ing a centralized European IP regime would significantly reduce 
transaction costs, which is especially relevant for Small and Me-
dium Enterprises (SMEs).
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bon prices will not suffice to create adequate market 
demand for immature low-C technologies. As long as 
their costs remain higher than those of more mature 
technologies (assuming an adequate carbon price) 
and their costs are falling as a result of learning-by-
doing, there is a case for additional support. How this 
is best achieved will depend on whether the buyer is 
regulated or not. 
For technologies used in competitive markets, their 
deployment can either be mandated in certain sectors 
or directly subsidized. Thus, technologies that are as-
sured of becoming cost-effective could be supported 
through standard setting. Standards can also assist 
in increasing the market size (e.g. for smart meters, 
where scale economies will reduce unit costs).13 For 
those products used by the public sector, niche mar-
kets can be created.14 If the potential public sector de-
mand is not large enough, but wide-scale deployment 
is socially justified, then either the installation or the 
use of these technologies may be subsidized: (i) tech-
nologies that do not need to be extensively used to 
overcome existing barriers (where, for example, the 
learning takes place in their manufacture and instal-
lation) may be better supported through capacity (in-
stallation or availability) payments; (ii) technologies 
that need to be extensively used to demonstrate suc-
cess can receive output support payments, possibly in 
addition to capacity subsidies.
Where the new clean technologies are deployed in 
regulated (mainly network) industries their use can 
be encouraged through regulation. Pérez-Arriaga 
(2009) discusses the regulatory instruments needed 
13 Again there are drawbacks to prematurely freezing a 
standard, for e.g. smart meters, and discouraging further market 
research and innovation that might deliver better products and 
standards. 
14 This has been the case e.g. for compact, low-cost, fluo-
rescent lamps in the US, whose demand in public schools and 
housing was guaranteed by the Department of Industry (National 
Research Council, 2001). Much energy R&D was effectively con-
ducted for military purposes.
for enhancing electricity grids to integrate intelligent 
demand response, distributed generation and stor-
age.15 Under rate-of-return regulation each specific 
investment proposal is assessed by the regulator and, 
if approved, its cost will be remunerated. It allows 
public authorities to decide which technologies need 
to be supported, and can support immature technol-
ogies, although there are many examples where the 
regulator was unwilling to risk consumers’ responses 
to higher prices for untried inventions.16 Investments 
can be directly included into the regulated asset base. 
Rate-of-return remuneration schemes have tradition-
ally been applied to transmission companies, though 
they had not been designed to reward the use of ad-
vanced, immature network technologies. The UK 
Low Carbon Network Fund (LCNF) set up recently 
by Ofgem is a scheme specifically aimed at encour-
aging the adoption of new low-C technologies. This 
fund is used to reward the implementation of new 
technology; operating and commercial arrangements 
by distribution system operators supporting a reliable 
and economic low-C electricity system (see also Of-
gem, 2010). 
Incentive-based remuneration schemes (such as 
price-caps) provide financial incentives for network 
companies to increase the efficiency of the devel-
opment and operation of their networks. These are 
output-driven schemes that reward the achievement 
of pre-set objectives through the use of any kind of 
technology at the disposal of the regulated company. 
In other words, incentive-based schemes encourage 
competition among technologies and, therefore, the 
use of those that are already cost competitive. Ofgem 
aims to place greater emphasis on rewarding innova-
tion in its proposed replacement for price-cap regula-
15 See e.g. Olmos et al. (2010) for a discussion about bar-
riers evolving when implementing response measures aimed at 
mitigating the impact of intermittent electricity generation.
16 Hausman (1997) argues that FCC’s refusal to allow 
AT&T to introduce early mobile phones into the asset base de-
layed innovation by years at high cost to the economy.
http://think.eui.eu 15
Public Support for the Financing of RD&D Activities in New Clean Energy Technologies
tion (RPI-X) for network utilities in its RIIO model 
(Revenue=Incentives+Innovation+Outputs).17
2.1.3 Need for direct public support
Market-pull (even with efficient carbon prices) is un-
likely to be sufficient to stimulate the development 
of immature pre-deployment technologies. These 
technologies face a number of barriers including (i) 
that immature low-C technologies typically pair high 
capital requirements with substantial economic, tech-
nical and regulatory uncertainties, hampering access 
to finance; and (ii) past considerable cost reduction 
from dynamic scale economies enjoyed by existing 
(clean) energy technologies, which impede the entry 
of new technologies unless they are granted adequate 
technology-specific support.18
Consequently, there is a gap between the cost of fi-
nancing the development of new clean technolo-
gies and the funds that private parties are willing to 
contribute, and hence, a need for direct public sup-
port. The size of this financing gap depends on the 
technology and can be determined by carrying out 
the same cost-benefit analysis that potential private 
investors would undertake before committing to any 
R&D project. Direct public support may also play an 
important role by certifying firms to outside inves-
tors (Lerner, 2002), who might then be more willing 
to contribute financial resources. 
17 For a description of Ofgem’s RIIO model aimed 
at replacing price-cap regulation used for the last 20 years 
see http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Pages/MoreInformation.
aspx?docid=10&refer=About%20us/CL
18 Different market failures to (low-C) innovation are also 
discussed in Martin and Scott (2000) and Foxon (2003). For an 
overview on theoretical analysis of the effects of environmental 
policy on technological change see Jaffe et al. (2002). For a de-
tailed discussion on the funding gap in the financing of R&D and 
innovation originating in imperfections of financial markets see 
Hall and Lerner (2009). 
2.2 Choosing among alternative 
financing instruments
There are three types of policy instruments that can 
directly mobilize public funds to support innovation: 
public loans/loan guarantees, public investment in 
the equity of innovating companies (Public-Private-
Equity-Partnerships, or PPEPs), and subsidies. We 
here distinguish among three classes of subsidies: 
prizes awarded to the winner of a contest to carry 
out a certain innovation; tax credits and other ben-
efits granted in proportion to private expenditures 
on RD&D; and grants or contracts that are awarded 
ex-ante to an innovating entity or consortium, whose 
size may or may not be conditioned by performance, 
and which may or may not require co-funding from 
the company (usually depending on the form of IPR 
allowed under the contract).
Guidance on the choice of financing instruments 
provided in this report must necessarily refer to gen-
eral types of clean innovation for two main reasons. 
First, there are many types of innovation processes in 
the SET Plan. Providing specific recommendations 
for each is not feasible within the time frame of the 
project. Recommendations for three specific innova-
tions are derived in the case study chapter (Section 
5). Second, deriving clear-cut recommendations re-
quires carrying out a rigorous cost-benefit analysis to 
determine the size of the existing financing gap. This 
is clearly beyond the scope of our analysis. 
The choice of financing instruments should be guid-
ed by the stage of development of the technology 
and its characteristics. These include its cost (size 
of investments required for the development of this 
technology),19 the interdependence between this 
technology and other new technologies, the radical 
19 Projects with costs below a few tens of million euros 
can be deemed to be lower cost. 
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vs. incremental nature of knowledge involved in the 
development of this technology and the status of the 
innovating entity (regulated vs. non-regulated). Fol-
lowing the classification provided by the EC (EC, 
2009c), we distinguish between a) close-to-be-mature 
technologies, which are, therefore, close to the market 
and whose deployment within the period 2011-2020 
seems feasible; b) those technologies that could be 
deployed within the period 2020-2035; and c) those 
that are still farther from the market and are therefore 
highly immature. References throughout the report 
to the level of technological maturity should be un-
derstood in terms of this classification.
The type of financial support required will then de-
pend on: (i) the size of the financing gap to be covered 
by public funds; (ii) the project’s ability to compete 
for public funds against other clean technologies; (iii) 
the likelihood that support to this technology will 
need to be cut off because it fails to deliver according 
to authorities’ expectations and (iv) the type of entity 
that is best suited to carry out this innovation.
» Size of the financing gap: The funding gap is the lev-
el of support needed to induce a company to under-
take the RD&D. It depends on the likely costs of the 
innovation relative to the expected future revenues, 
which depend on the probability that the technology 
reaches the market and the time profiles of market 
revenues in the case of successful deployment. The 
cost and market revenues depend on the stage of the 
innovation, its cost intensity, its dependence on other 
innovations or infrastructure to be built, the type of 
knowledge to be acquired through this innovation 
(radical versus incremental) and the regulatory status 
of the innovating entity. 
» Capacity of this technology to compete with oth-
ers for public funds: This depends on the maturity 
of the technology. If the technology is less mature 
than alternative clean technologies that also require 
direct public support, public authorities will have to 
earmark and directly assign the necessary support 
funds. Where clean technologies are mature enough, 
they should be left to compete for general low-C pub-
lic funds, since this competitive pressure will drive 
down costs and favour innovation. 
» Likelihood that the support for this technology 
will be cut off: Where the probability of a technology 
reaching the market is low but the ex-ante potential 
gains if this happens are high (e.g. fusion reactors 
in the 1950s) experience may allow a more realistic 
assessment of the potential of this technology. The 
information collected during the project may reveal 
that the initial prospects now seem far less favourable 
and this technology no longer deserves support. In 
such cases anticipating the need for possible future 
exit should condition the way the original support is 
provided. 
» Type of entity carrying out the innovation: Pub-
lic support will only trigger innovation if it reaches 
the entities likely and able to undertake the desired 
RD&D, which will depend on the cost and nature of 
the innovation (radical or incremental) the past in-
novation record of the entity, and whether this inno-
vation requires integration with a small or large num-
ber of related innovations and/or processes. Costly 
RD&D can only be afforded by large companies, who 
are also best placed to deliver incremental improve-
ments. Radical innovation typically is best carried out 
by small innovating entities. The comparative advan-
tage of universities and related research institutes lies 
also in more basic, early-research and smaller-scale 
projects.20 Finally, an innovation involving several 
20 The experience of funding universities has been gen-
erally very positive, usually with higher estimated social returns 
than allocating funds to other recipients (see Haskell and Wallace, 
2010, and references therein). Their strength lies in the strong in-
ternational and domestic competitive pressures to which they are 
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technologies is better carried out by entities with 
cross-technology expertise or through collaborative 
research partnerships. 
Funding support provided to an innovation project 
should not only match its characteristics but at the 
same time be aimed at maximizing the expected so-
cial benefits produced by this project. The greater the 
ratio of private or MS support per euro of EU support, 
the larger the number of projects that can be support-
ed, and, other things equal, the higher the expected 
overall social welfare increase. Therefore, direct sup-
port provided to an innovation process should have 
the lowest (EU) public cost possible that is compat-
ible with the project being undertaken and the results 
being effectively disseminated. 
The choice of support instrument should then be 
made according to the following features of instru-
ments: (a) their ability to trigger innovation at rea-
subject (for faculty, post-docs, grants, etc.). 
sonable public cost; (b) their ability to target a specific 
technology and redirect support to others if neces-
sary, and (c) the type of innovator that is best suited 
to receive the type of support provided through them. 
Figure 2 illustrates the application of the analytical 
framework that has just been laid out.
2.3 Assessing available instruments
Criteria to guide the selection of direct support in-
struments – as identified in the previous subsection 
– are now employed to determine the type of innova-
tion that is best supported by each of the main types 
of instruments considered. Available experience on 
the application of instruments is also discussed.
2.3.1 Public loans or loan guarantees
Public loans (or loan guarantees) shall replace private 
ones when capital markets are not liquid enough or 
when, due to asymmetry of information, the public 
administration is better informed than private inves-
Figure 2.  Analytical framework to be applied to select appropriate financing instruments
Innovation process 
variables
Stage of 
process
Capital 
intensity
Technology 
interdepen.
Type of 
knowledge
Size of financing gap to be 
covered
Type of innovating entity
Type of 
direct 
support 
needed
Loans
Equity
Prizes
Capacity to compete for 
funds with other technol.
Likelihood that support 
must be cut off
Tax 
Financing 
instruments
Features conditioning the type 
of support needed
Grants
Maximization of social welfare via matching the type of support needed with support provided 
by instruments at the lowest public cost possible
Regulatory 
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tors about the risks involved in an innovation process 
and, therefore, is prepared to offer more advanta-
geous interest rates.
Experience with the use of this instrument: Loans have 
mainly funded expensive innovations in later stages 
of development. We have not found any evidence 
of the successful application of public loans to fund 
pre-deployment clean energy RD&D. Loans provided 
through the Risk Sharing Financing Facility loans21 
in the EU have managed to leverage a significant 
amount of private investments in RD&D either alone 
or in combination with other support instruments. 
Projects financed include the demonstration of CSP 
plants (also backed with deployment support sys-
tems) and the development of bio-ethanol technolo-
gies (EIB, 2010). According to US federal govern-
ment plans, loan guarantees shall be used in the US to 
overcome barriers to the construction of Generation 
3 nuclear plants and demonstrate their commercial 
viability, though some difficulties are being found to 
make the financing deals (Reuters, 2010).
Ability to fund innovation at a reasonable cost: Loans 
are less attractive to innovators than subsidies, since 
the amount of funds obtained must be paid back to 
the investor together with the agreed interest rate. 
However, they may be able to close the financing gap 
of low-cost, pre-deployment innovation that is ex-
pected to render large market revenues to private in-
vestors at a high enough probability. If the innovating 
entity is deemed to be able to pay back a loan with a 
21 The RSFF has been jointly created by the European 
Investment Bank and the EC. For more information, see http://
www.eib.org/products/loans/special/rsff/index.htm. A successful 
example is the provision of a €200 million RSFF loan to the Span-
ish wind turbine manufacturer Gamesa co-funding its 2008-2011 
research program. Additional funds come from Spain and the 
private innovator. A sustainable R&D strategy, including diverse 
projects in turbine and storage technologies is followed based 
on cooperations with third research centres. Numerous patents 
could be filed. 
high enough level of certainty, public loans turn out 
to be less expensive for the tax payer than any other 
form of direct support.22 
Targeting of technologies: Public loans or loan guar-
antees allow authorities to target a specific technol-
ogy or technological option. The choice of which in-
novator or project-company receives a loan is with 
authorities, while loan provisions can specify the use 
to be made of funds provided. Loans can lead to a 
financing lock-in, when, in order not to write off the 
funds provided to an innovating entity that is not able 
to pay credits back, public authorities keep providing 
further support to avoid its bankruptcy. Thus, loans 
should not be applied to fund highly risky innovation 
conducted by small entities. 
Type of innovating entity: Public loans are best suited 
to fund pre-deployment innovation conducted by 
large innovating entities whose financial capability is 
proven.
2.3.2 Publicly Private Equity Partnerships 
(PPEPs)
Experience with the use of this instrument: Most eq-
uity investments in innovation have traditionally 
addressed technologies that were already available 
for their wide-scale deployment, though seed equity 
investments have also been employed at the pre-de-
ployment stage. Evidence on clean energy innova-
tion suggests that, within the pre-deployment stages, 
PPEPs have predominantly been used to fund inex-
pensive innovation in the early stages of R&D. The 
22 Public guarantees for private loans, which involve the 
same allocation of risks as public loans, could have a lower public 
cost than public loans if the liquidity of the capital market is suf-
ficiently high. In effect, the public sector may be able to borrow 
risky funds at lower cost as it has a wider cost base (the entire 
public budget, a significant fraction of GDP) to bear that risk. 
Against that, it may be less well-informed about the real success 
probability and more prone to optimism bias.
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Carbon Trust provides an interesting example. Car-
bon Trust Investments Ltd is the seed and venture 
capital investment arm set up by the Carbon Trust 
to push clean innovation in the UK. It has invested 
in various technologies (CSP, wave, bio-fuels and en-
ergy efficiency). Investments are never larger than a 
few million pounds and never represent more than 
50% of the equity of a company. They have attracted 
investments by other private parties that are several 
times the amount provided by the Trust. The Trust 
closely monitors funded companies’ activities and 
participates in its management. During the first five 
years of operation, the internal rate-of-return (IRR) 
on these investments was about 19% (MHB, 2007). 
Ability to fund innovation at a reasonable cost: Exter-
nal equity financing is less attractive to innovators 
than subsidies, since revenues obtained by the inno-
vator from the process undertaken must be shared 
among equity holders. Despite this, and according to 
Carpenter and Petersen (2002), equity may be able to 
engage small entities in risky innovation that loans 
are not able to trigger. Unlike loans, equity does not 
create financial distress in these entities because pay-
ments to investors are contingent on the success of 
innovation. Besides, publicly owned equity provides 
small entities with the collateral they need to obtain 
additional debt-based funds. Finally, public equity in-
vestments allow the administration and other inves-
tors to help drive innovation, which can increase its 
probability of success and, therefore, can also help to 
close the existing financing gap. On the other hand, 
large companies may find loans more attractive than 
publicly owned equity, given that (i) the risk premi-
um they will have to pay when getting credit is lower 
than that paid by small innovating entities; (ii) unlike 
small entities, they will not be so subject to financial 
distress caused by loans; and (iii) they are likely to 
have access to the (private) equity market on more 
acceptable terms. 
PPEPs allow the public to profit from supporting suc-
cessful RD&D, and should reduce the support cost 
relative to grants. On the other hand, given the risky 
nature of innovation and difficulty faced by authori-
ties in identifying winning technologies, equity may 
have a higher cost than loans.
Targeting of technologies: PPEPs allow authorities to 
choose which innovation processes to back but it may 
be harder to introduce competition for these funds – al-
though the act of choosing in which company to invest 
represents a form of competition. Thus, public equity 
should only be used to support technologies that can-
not yet compete with other clean options. Project failure 
(and criteria to determine success or failure need to be 
negotiated in the original equity injection) allows pro-
jects to be terminated before they become too expensive 
and, to that extent, this instrument allows a more flex-
ible reallocation of support funds over time than con-
ventional subsidies or loans might permit. 
Type of innovating entity: It is only the market value of 
small entities or project companies that is intimately 
associated with the success of each innovation project 
they undertake. Therefore, only equity investments in 
these entities allow the public sector to profit from the 
success of the innovation it funds. 
2.3.3 Prizes awarded to the winner of a con-
test
Experience with the use of this instrument: Prizes 
have typically been awarded to successful innova-
tors in contests organized to conduct inexpensive, 
radical R&D including the construction of first pro-
totypes. The NASA Centennial Challenges Power 
Beaming Competition (NASA, 2010), for example, 
was launched in 2005 to develop a technology that 
could allow photovoltaic cells in the outer space to 
beam power to earth. At the end of the year 2007, no 
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winner had been found, but the US$ 900,000 prize 
triggered a significant amount of research from nu-
merous participants that allowed the technology to be 
pushed forward. Another example is the MIT Clean 
Energy Prize, which has funded revolutionary inno-
vation like an electrode able to increase the amount 
of light penetrating PV panels by 12% (MIT, 2010).
Ability to fund innovation at a reasonable cost: Prizes 
place techno-economic risks of RD&D activities on 
the innovator (see also Newell, 2007). Thus, prizes 
must be much larger than those grants that would suf-
fice to trigger the corresponding innovation process. 
Prizes offered to undertake costly processes would 
then have to be very large in size. Besides, up front 
investments in this type of processes could probably 
not be afforded by small innovators participating in a 
contest. Hence, prizes should typically trigger inex-
pensive innovation.
Prizes are a form of subsidy and, therefore, must be 
deemed expensive compared to loans or publicly 
owned equity. However, by rewarding outputs rather 
than inputs, prizes provide efficiency incentives to the 
innovator, thus eliminating the risk of moral hazard 
behaviour and increasing the probability of success, 
which ultimately reduces their public cost. Besides, 
prizes result in contenders exploring parallel research 
paths, which is highly advisable in risky innovation 
and could, alternatively, only be achieved by funding 
several research projects. 
Targeting of technologies: In prize contests, competi-
tors choose how best to meet the target set by authori-
ties. Given that prize givers do not commit resources 
to any specific process, they do not run the risk of 
being locked into funding it.
Type of innovating entity: The administrative burden 
born by participants in prize contests is smaller than 
that created by other instruments, which favours the 
participation of small entities. However, small enti-
ties may have liquidity problems when facing high 
upfront costs to be paid by innovators in a contest.
2.3.4 Tax credits and other benefits associ-
ated with private expenditures on RD&D
Experience with the use of this instrument: Ofgem’s In-
novation Funding Incentive (IFI) is an interesting ex-
ample of cost-sharing stimulus to clean innovation. 
It has triggered a significant amount of innovation 
by distribution network operators (DNOs). DNOs in 
the UK are recompensed up to 80% of the cost of new 
technologies that contribute to reliable networks op-
eration in a low-C system. The innovation supported 
under IFI tends to be relatively inexpensive (less than 
one million pounds). Incentives from IFI are combined 
with those created by the RPI-X scheme (see Baukne-
cht, 2007). Newell (2007) concludes that tax credits in 
the US are successfully supplementing rather than re-
placing private innovation funds and estimates that tax 
credit schemes in place have resulted in several billion 
dollars of extra investments in innovation. 
Ability to fund innovation at a reasonable cost: Evi-
dence collected shows that tax credits and rebates for 
RD&D expenditures may trigger a significant amount 
of additional innovation. However, both tax credit 
and rebate schemes normally leave the decision on 
which innovation to undertake in the hands of pri-
vate entrepreneurs and investors, who find close to 
the market activities more attractive than early, risky 
ones. Thus, private revenues from these schemes are 
unlikely to be used to fund a significant amount of 
pre-deployment RD&D. Rebate schemes applied to 
regulated utilities may be an exception to this general 
trend, since the resulting investments can be guided 
by the regulator when determining whether to in-
clude them in the asset base.
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Tax credits and rebates are a form of subsidy. There-
fore, their cost is likely to be higher than public loans 
or public equity. However, the former are less likely 
to crowd out private investments than conventional 
grants, since the former are granted on the condition of 
private investments in innovation already taking place. 
Therefore, the public cost of the innovation triggered 
by benefit schemes is probably lower than that of in-
novation funded with conventional subsidies.
Targeting of technologies: Targeting a technology with 
tax credits is not possible because the decision on 
which specific RD&D activity to fund is left in the 
hands of innovators. Therefore, assuming that pri-
vate entities are more agile than the administration 
in redefining investment priorities, tax credits should 
be more flexible than conventional subsidies in being 
directed to successful innovation.
Type of innovating entity: Tax exemptions can only 
reach large companies paying a significant amount of 
taxes. Rebates can be provided to smaller entities as 
well. In any case, entities receiving this form of sup-
port must be large enough to bear upfront investment 
costs on their own, since these benefit schemes only 
reward innovation already undertaken.
2.3.5 Conventional subsidies (grants, con-
tracts)
Experience with the use of this instrument: Grants and 
contracts are by far the preferred policy instruments 
to fund clean energy innovation of any type. Evi-
dence suggests that competition for funds increases 
the probability of innovation success, and so do co-
funding (receiving funds from several investors) and 
continuous performance monitoring. Most success-
ful close-to-the-market subsidized projects normally 
receive output-driven support. The ability to rede-
fine project objectives if necessary has also played 
a relevant role in overcoming barriers in successful 
projects23. Additionally, consistency between the in-
novating institution’s objectives, its research strategy 
and internal policies on issues such as the control of 
intellectual property is also important. Lack of con-
sistency normally creates obstacles to sustainability 
and success, impeding revenue development and po-
tentially also demotivating staff as shown in Ferrari 
(2009), where R&D activities in nuclear institutes at 
Central and Eastern Europe are discussed.24
Ability of this instrument to fund innovation at a 
reasonable cost: Grants and contracts can engage 
innovating entities in the least commercially attrac-
tive projects, like expensive, early-stage research or 
RD&D activities carried out by regulated entities, 
whose revenues tend to be limited. Conventional sub-
sidies reduce the fraction of the project costs born by 
the innovating entity, including upfront costs, while 
not reducing its revenues from the project. Howev-
er, if innovators in subsidized projects are restricted 
in the terms of any resulting IPR, the private profit-
ability of these projects may be significantly reduced, 
which may probably require the provision of a larger 
subsidy. Conventional subsidies are the most expen-
sive pubic support instrument. Output driven subsi-
dies are less expensive than input driven ones, but are 
not attractive to innovators in projects where risks 
involved are high.
23 The PV Commercialization Program undertaken in the 
1970s and 1980s in the US (Cohen and Noll, 1991) is an interest-
ing example of the successful use of innovation subsidies. Creat-
ing competition among different technological concepts allowed 
authorities to identify the most promising options; the menu of 
alternatives was gradually reduced. Despite the fact that subsidies 
were input-driven, authorities managed to create some pressure 
to achieve good results by dropping projects that made slow prog-
ress.        
24 Funding typically is provided to a substantial share in 
the form of government grants. Many cases reported a lack of any 
business plan or a policy for the protection and management of 
IP, staff rewards not linked to the institute’s objectives, and dis-
connected communication between innovators and funders. 
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Targeting of technologies: Authorities must choose 
which innovation to subsidize. This allows them to 
target even the least commercially appealing process-
es but is, at the same time, a source of potential inef-
ficiencies. The public sector is not necessarily the best 
informed nor the most experienced in making such 
choices. Private investments may thus be crowded 
out if subsidies are provided to projects that would 
otherwise be financed by private parties. Besides, due 
to the inability of authorities to precisely assess the 
social potential of innovation processes and encour-
age efficiency in their management, the share of failed 
innovation projects that are subsidized is likely to be 
higher than that for projects receiving other forms 
of public support. Finally, the use of subsidies may 
lead to a financial lock-in. An example of this is the 
US Algae Biofuel research program, where funding 
spanned 20 years despite poor results (Cagw, 2010).
Type of innovating entity: Grants and contracts can be 
provided to any type of innovating entity.
2.3.6 Summary and conclusions 
From the assessment conducted above – which is also 
summarized in Table 2, the following conclusions can 
be drawn: Loans are well suited to finance lower cost, 
potentially profitable innovation carried out by large 
companies. Public loans should be used instead of 
private loans if the liquidity of the capital market is 
low or if the innovation targeted is related to activi-
ties where the public sector is more experienced (e.g. 
RD&D in nuclear). Public loans are also attractive in 
recessions when the private appetite for risk (“animal 
spirits”) is unduly depressed. Public equity is suitable 
to finance risky, potentially highly profitable, innova-
tion preferably undertaken by small entities. Public 
equity investments should be of modest size, though 
they may be used to marginally fund expensive in-
novation to signal that it has a high potential. Prizes 
can be used to fund early low-cost innovation pref-
erably conducted by universities and research insti-
tutes, though they may be received both by small and 
large entities. Tax credits, rebates and other benefits 
on private innovation expenditures are probably only 
suited to supporting close-to-the-market, incremen-
tal innovation conducted by large companies or that 
conducted by regulated entities. Grants and contracts, 
especially input-driven ones, should only be awarded 
to socially desirable clean energy innovation that will 
not be undertaken otherwise. This is clearly the case 
of a significant number of early-stage, capital-inten-
sive processes. Some other pre-deployment RD&D 
activities may also need to be subsidized. Subsidies 
and rebates on innovation investments are especially 
relevant in RD&D activities carried out by regulated 
entities (like energy transmission and distribution 
companies).25
3. Framing the release of public 
funds
Public support should avoid wasting public money 
while encouraging private sector’s participation in in-
novation. This chapter discusses the framing of the re-
lease of public funds to minimize the risk of ‘funding 
failure’. It builds on evidence gathered from past RD&D 
projects, the body of academic literature and industry 
reports. Section 4.1 discusses conditions for the release 
of funds for both low- and high-risk projects. Section 
4.2 provides guidelines for optimal contract design. In 
Section 4.3 we carry out an analysis of the measure-
ment of performance of innovation projects. This is 
relevant to identify which innovation projects to fund, 
25 Revenues of regulated entities are also regulated and, 
therefore, unlikely to increase very significantly as a result of the 
use of innovative technologies or processes. Hence, the funding 
gap of innovation conducted by these entities tends to be larger 
than that of otherwise similar innovation conducted in deregu-
lated entities. Besides, the size of regulated entities (medium to 
large in most cases) makes them generally unsuitable to be sup-
ported through publicly owned equity or prizes.
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to learn about the type of support that best adapts to 
each type of innovation, and to redirect funds to al-
ternative projects if a certain project is not delivering 
as initially expected. Thus, performance measurement 
is also related to the discussions presented in Chapter 
2. Finally, Section 4.4 highlights selected important is-
sues related to institutional support. 
3.1 Conditions for the release and 
withdrawal of funds
Funding low-risk projects requires providing strong 
efficiency incentives. One option is to make the re-
lease of funds and their amount conditional on the 
achievement of some minimum objectives. Given the 
high probability of success in these projects, linking 
support to project performance should encourage the 
innovator to carry out his function efficiently and re-
duce the public cost of support, while not prejudicing 
his willingness to undertake the project. A lack of in-
novators’ liquidity or their concern about the cred-
ibility of the funding may indicate releasing some 
or all the funds up front or at stages during project 
execution on condition that they are returned if the 
project is not undertaken as agreed. 
Demonstration projects, like that of the CCTS value 
chain discussed below in one of the case studies, are 
good candidates for conditional funding. Tax credits 
and rebate schemes, where the provision of public sup-
port is conditioned on the realization of RD&D invest-
ments, can also be used to provide efficiency incentives.
Table 2: Summary of the characteristics of technology-push instruments
Instruments Public loans/ loan 
guarantees
Publicly owned 
equity
Subsidies
Prizes Tax credits and oth-
er benefits related 
to investments
Grants and con-
tracts 
Ability to trigger 
innovation at a 
reasonable cost
Size of the financ-
ing gap it is able to 
cover
Lower than subsi-
dies. Larger than 
public equity for 
large innovating 
entities
Lower than subsi-
dies. Larger than 
public loans for 
small innovating 
entities
Medium. Able to 
fund low cost early 
research but not 
expensive innova-
tion
High.  But only ap-
plicable to RD&D 
close to market
Very high. Capable 
of engaging enti-
ties in any kind of 
innovation stages  
Public cost Very low Lower than sub-
sidies
Medium Relatively high High
Targeting of the 
technology
Targeting of a 
specific technology
Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Flexibility in redi-
recting funds
Low Relatively high High Relatively high Low
Targeting of the 
innovating entity
Type of innovating 
entity well suited 
to receiving this 
support
Large entities with 
proven financial 
capability or small 
entities addressing 
low-risk innovation
Small to medium 
entities 
Any (more suitable 
than other options 
to small entities 
when undertake 
low-cost invest-
ments)
Addressed at large 
entities that 1) 
pay large taxes; 2) 
already perform 
RD&D 
Any
Conclusions
Type of innovation processes that are 
well suited to be supported by these 
instruments
1) Low-risk in-
novation; 2) Risky, 
potentially profit-
able innovation by 
large firms. Only if 
illiquid capital mar-
kets or little private 
expertise 
Low cost, poten-
tially profitable 
innovation whose 
risk of failure is 
high and that is 
carried out by 
small innovating 
entities 
Low cost innova-
tion processes 
involving a large 
amount of applied 
R&D
Processes in the 
last stages of the 
innovation chain 
carried out by large 
entities (incremen-
tal innovation)
Processes in the 
early stages of 
innovation, facing 
significant barriers 
and spillovers. 
Some processes in 
regulated entities.
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Provided the innovation targeted is socially desir-
able because of its high potential, high-risk projects 
should not be supported based on performance, since 
otherwise innovators might not be willing to under-
take them, nor will they attract private investment at 
an acceptable cost. Prizes are an exception, since they 
make the financing of risky innovation conditional 
on success. However, they are only likely to be use-
ful if the research undertaken is inexpensive and the 
prestige associated with winning a prize is of great 
value to the innovator. Thus, prizes are likely to be 
best suited to universities and research institutes. 
Even when the funds provided do not depend on per-
formance (in terms of success or failure), authorities 
can still impose input-related conditions on the release 
of funds. The UK Carbon Trust makes equity partici-
pation conditional on the presence of external inves-
tors. Co-funding allows the Trust to share the risk of 
early innovation, creates incentives on the innovator’s 
side to carry out its function efficiently (including the 
early termination of the project) if he is contributing 
significant resources and provides a third opinion on 
the value of innovation undertaken (MHB, 2007).
Given that RD&D is inherently risky and few early-
stage projects will evolve into viable technologies, it is 
also important to predetermine the conditions under 
which support will be withdrawn if it becomes clear 
that the approach followed is unpromising. Again, 
co-funding private companies or ensuring that those 
undertaking the R&D have committed valuable re-
sources reduces the risk of the innovator continuing 
beyond the point of evident failure, while fully fund-
ed public research laboratories have no such reason 
to stop. There is a balance to be struck between pre-
mature evaluation and institutionalizing continued 
funding, which is less likely with project-specific sup-
port but a greater risk with automatic subsidies.
3.2 Contract design for public funding
For the innovator, the most attractive contract is up-
front funding unconditional on project performance. 
However, since this is the most expensive option 
from a public point of view, it should be reserved for 
high-risk projects, such as grant-funded early-stage 
research in universities or laboratories, and only used 
if other approaches will not deliver. Providing assured 
funding to centres of excellence (contingent on con-
tinued performance) attracts researchers and keeps 
research groups alive. Up-front unconditional funds 
may be provided as a fixed amount. However, provid-
ing instead funds covering a certain fraction of pro-
ject costs might allow the public investor to benefit 
from below-budget delivery (successful projects that 
meet objectives at a cost lower than expected). 
Public funding of low-risk projects should be output-
driven, i.e. it should depend on project performance. 
Thus, the EU’s proposals for the funding of each of the 
12 different CCS plants to be demonstrated in Europe 
within the CCS Industrial Initiative make receipt of 
public funds “dependent upon the verified avoidance 
of CO2 emissions”.26 Here, a clear distinction must be 
made between the risk affecting future market rev-
enues from innovation, which in the case of CCS dem-
onstration projects can be deemed high, and the risk of 
failure of the project itself, which tends to be quite low 
in demonstration projects of already reliable technolo-
gies. In order to measure the degree of accomplish-
ment of the objectives of a project, Key Performance 
Indicators (KPIs) must be defined (see Section 4.3).
26 There are apparent attractions in linking the funding 
of RD&D in low-C technologies to the sale of EU emission al-
lowances (EUAs). Thus, each of the approved CCS demonstra-
tion projects will receive up to 45 million EUAs. This, however, 
has drawbacks, as it magnifies the carbon price risk facing the 
projects (CCC (2008) forecasts an EUA price of €40-45 which is 
about three times the current price). Increasing the project risk 
will increase the support cost. Member State Governments could 
nevertheless take on all that risk by immediately selling the EUAs, 
but then may face a shortfall if, as has happened, the EUA price 
has since fallen.
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Performance-related funding can either be disbursed 
on successful conclusion or sequentially based on 
reaching intermediate objectives. Setting intermedi-
ate objectives and monitoring their achievement al-
lows the early termination of projects not delivering 
results or a reorientation in objectives or research 
strategy if that raises the probability of eventual suc-
cess. This should be the approach followed in high 
cost projects (mainly demonstration) and in large 
RD&D programmes involving a large number of in-
terconnected projects. 
3.3 Performance determination
Measuring or estimating the performance of innova-
tion projects serves two main purposes. First, it al-
lows funds to be (re-)targeted on the technologies 
that demonstrate or are expected to have the largest 
potential. Second, it allows estimating and learn-
ing about the most appropriate form of support to 
each type of innovation project. The resulting ex-
perience gained should guide the design of support 
programmes. However, monitoring is costly and it is 
important to strike the right balance when deciding 
how many and which variables to monitor, how fre-
quently to measure performance, and which evalua-
tion methods to use.
3.3.1 Designing an assessment methodology 
The first step in designing an assessment methodol-
ogy is to identify the relevant performance criteria or 
Key Performance Indicators. Low-level KPIs measure 
the progress made in meeting the objectives of each 
specific project. High-level KPIs relate to the broader 
objective of cost-competitively reducing future car-
bon emissions. The fulfilment of SET Plan and EU 
energy policy objectives should be assessed at pro-
gram, rather than project, level in order to drive the 
design of innovation programs or the SET Plan itself. 
The second step is to decide on how and when to 
measure the KPIs. This includes:
» The frequency and timing of assessments: Assess-
ments may take place (i) ex-ante, to select which 
projects to undertake, as discussed in Section 2; (ii) 
during project execution to monitor its evolution and 
decide on potential extension, early termination or a 
shift in objectives; and/or (iii) ex-post to assess the 
overall impact of the project and draw lessons for fu-
ture support schemes.
» The computation methodology adopted: Main op-
tions in this regard are (a) direct measurement of the 
variable, as in field experiments; (b) top-down meth-
odologies based on econometric analyses identify-
ing aggregated functions linking inputs and outputs 
(KPIs) of the project/programme focusing on market 
feedbacks and interactions; and (c) bottom-up meth-
odologies determining the impact of project inputs 
on outcomes (KPIs) through the detailed modelling 
of technologies. As McFarland et al. (2004) explain, 
market or economy-wide feedbacks and interactions, 
like the impact on electricity prices of the massive use 
of more cost-efficient clean technologies, are not nor-
mally modelled in bottom-up models.
3.3.2 Measuring the performance of clean 
energy innovation projects
Performance measurement addresses two issues. 
First, the measurement of technology (i.e. project) 
performance and second, the measurement of the 
performance of support provided.
A// Measuring technology performance
The performance of clean technologies should be esti-
mated ex-ante to guide the selection of projects to be 
funded and set performance targets guiding decisions 
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on funding continuation and/or termination. That 
requires periodic monitoring of actual performance 
against these target values and the performance of 
other technologies in order to assess whether a reallo-
cation of funds or a redefinition of technology objec-
tives is necessary. While the KPIs used to set ex-ante 
targets and those monitored ex-post (during project 
development) are the same, the ways in which they 
are specified and/or measured normally differ. 
» KPIs to use: KPIs used to assess technology merits 
can be related to economic efficiency (cost reduction), 
technical or environmental performance. Thus, most 
of the sector-specific KPIs set out in EC (2009c) un-
surprisingly are related to economic efficiency and 
target percentage equivalent production cost reduc-
tions or levels by 2020 (e.g. for CCS cost reductions 
by 30-40%, production cost level of bio-energy in 
electricity production to below €0.05/kWh), costs of 
abating CO2 measured through the impact of abate-
ment on energy efficiencies (e.g. for CCS > 40% with 
capture, > 50% without capture) or, for process inno-
vation related to the implementation of network solu-
tions, operation and investment costs. KPIs targeting 
the environmental impact of technologies mainly refer 
to the use of natural resources, like the use of water by 
CSP or the use of land/sea space by off-shore wind and 
transmission installations. KPIs monitoring economic 
or environmental performance are most relevant for 
technologies that are relatively mature (medium to low 
distance to the market) since the functioning of these 
technologies has already been proved, normally, but 
they are still subject to significant cost risks that im-
pede their commercial deployment.
Finally, KPIs dealing with technical performance typi-
cally have to do with availability standards (e.g. capac-
ity factors for virtual wind farms > 80%, CO2 capture 
in CCS > 90% with availability > 80%, PV lives > 40 
years, and of inverters > 25 years), standards for data ac-
curacy (wind resource identified within 3%), technical 
efficiency in the production, transmission or consump-
tion of energy (like the efficiency of electricity consum-
ing appliances) or, for network process innovation, the 
capacity of the network to host active demand and/or 
low-C generation. KPIs measuring technical perfor-
mance (efficiency, life-time) are relevant throughout the 
whole technology development process. However, those 
focusing on reliability are critical during the early stages 
when technology still needs to be proved.
To the extent that objectives set are realistic, these 
KPIs seem appropriate, and will presumably be sub-
ject to revision in the light of the experience gained. 
» Computation methodology: Estimating ex-ante 
the performance of a technology is only possible by 
computing the relevant KPIs through bottom-up 
methodologies. The accomplishment of technical 
and environmental objectives of an innovation pro-
ject (ex-post or during project execution) should be 
directly assessed (measured) if possible. Bottom-up 
methodologies would probably have to be applied to 
compute the value of those KPIs related to the eco-
nomic objectives of a project.
B// Measuring the performance of the support pro-
vided
KPIs addressing the performance of support provid-
ed should measure the quality of project management 
including variables such as the fraction of total pro-
ject expenses covered by private funds; the ratio of 
actual project expenses corresponding to predefined 
activities to expenses for them considered in the pro-
ject budget; the time to contract or the time to under-
take predefined activities.
In judging the suitability of the chosen form of sup-
port, one should also check whether the assump-
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tions guiding the choice were correct and whether 
other successful projects of the same type received 
the same type of support. KPIs that compare perfor-
mance against similar projects similarly financed can 
test this aspect.
3.4 Further institutional support
There is more to supporting innovation than the mere 
provision of public funds. As Branscomb and Auer-
swald (2002) highlight, authorities should also focus 
on the quality of support. Institutions supporting 
clean RD&D may provide innovators not only with 
financial resources but also with a set of services in-
cluding professional advice on the assessment of their 
business case and the management of their project 
and a network of contacts including potential inves-
tors, clients and research partners. Networking efforts 
at all these three levels may be necessary to produce 
a significant amount of publicly supported (and con-
ducted) innovation that is of use to the industry. It is 
clearly desirable to remove existing barriers between 
national research policies as far as possible. 
Authors in MHB (2007) analyze both the funding and 
institutional support provided by the Carbon Trust in 
the UK. Non-funding support can best be provided by 
public entities, or private ones publicly funded, that have 
the cross-technology knowledge required to promote 
clean RD&D involving any of the relevant SET Plan 
technologies (cross-technology support institutions).
The advisability of creating pan-European entities of 
this kind has been assessed in EC (2009c). Authors 
analyze different institutional frameworks for the 
support of innovation including (i) a business-as-
usual scenario (BAU), where institutional arrange-
ments and level of funding remain unchanged; (ii) 
an increase in funding through existing investment 
vehicles; (iii) the strengthening of the relationships 
or links among funding and innovating entities that 
already exist (formalizing these relationships) and, 
finally, (iv) the creation of new institutional arrange-
ments, including the creation of new pan-European 
entities managing and partially conducting clean 
research and innovation. They conclude that more 
funds and stronger, official, commitments on collabo-
ration among entities must be put in place to produce 
clean innovation needed.27 However, according to the 
EC, pan-European holistic research institutions may 
only be cost effective to conduct or promote expen-
sive cross-technology innovation where international 
cooperation is critical (like nuclear fusion). 
The US has a long-lasting experience with federal 
agencies with mixed results. As a funding body, the US 
Defence Advanced Research Project Agency (DAR-
PA), with no in-house R&D capability, has been high-
ly successful in allocating funds primarily to private 
firms, partly because it has a very well specified mis-
sion with strong political support. This would seem 
to be an attractive institution to replicate – perhaps 
a ‘Low aCARPA’ along the lines of President Obama’s 
Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy. In con-
trast, the US Advanced Technology Program (ATP) 
was set up to provide R&D funds to private firms for 
27 The case of international R&D in hydrogen and fuel 
cells reveals the risk of inefficient public spending when collabo-
ration among institutions – even though highly important – is 
missed out. In the 1980s/1990s, Norway had four (comparatively 
large) hydrogen R&D projects (see Godoe and Nygaard, 2006). 
Three of them had been driven by the objective to use abundant 
natural gas reserves as a feedstock for fuel cells. Reasons for the 
failure of the latter are diverse; they include a lack of strong stra-
tegic leadership on a national level, a lack of long-term commit-
ment by the stakeholders, and an inefficient duplication of effort 
in pursuing similar technological goals. Only the fourth project, 
targeting the development of unmanned submarines, has been a 
successful innovation, even though the application moved from 
military to non-military use. This is in line with the discussion of 
Stoft and Dopazo (2010) who even argue, when discussing the 
case of Hydrogen research, that “no single economy (either US 
or EU) can reasonably and profitably face required efforts in iso-
lation” (p. 290). They also underline that “despite its faults, the 
US centralized research approach has been much more successful 
than the less-structured and fragmented EU pursuit” (p. 290).
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pre-commercial R&D with high social benefits that 
promises eventual commercial benefits but which 
would not be carried out in the private sector without 
government support. It has been widely criticized as 
an inappropriate use of public funds, and lacks the 
political support enjoyed by DARPA.
As argued in Section 3, the key to success may be 
more related to the features of support institutions 
than with their footprint. Cross-technology institu-
tions providing funding and institutional support can 
also be created at the national level. National institu-
tions with the required technical and managerial ex-
pertise should be well-suited to identifying research 
centres of excellence and setting up stable relation-
ships with them. Again, the Carbon Trust is a good 
example.
Institutional support may be critical to the success of 
innovation conducted by small- and medium-sized 
entities (SMEs). Institutional arrangements relevant 
to make the support to innovation in SMEs effective 
and efficient have been discussed extensively within 
several European research projects. An example is 
the EUROMAPLIVE28 project, where the consortium 
proposed the creation of a European executive agen-
cy to select innovative projects from SMEs deserving 
support; allocate public subsidies to cover the costs of 
the early innovation stages; and connect these SMEs 
with private investors willing to invest in equity to 
support subsequent commercialization of the result-
ing products. 
28 EUROMAPLIVE was a FP5 project run by a Euro-
pean consortium made of I.CON INNOVATION (Germany), 
CAPITALIA (Italy), OXFORD Innovation (United-Kingdom), 
ASESORIA INDUSTRIAL ZABALA (Spain), ASCENT (Bel-
gium), and TECHNOFI (France).
4. Case Studies
This chapter presents three representative case stud-
ies of innovation process that are of interest within 
the European Industrial Initiatives of the SET Plan: 
(i) the first large-scale demonstration of the CCTS 
value chain, (ii) R&D in the design of new solar PV 
materials, and (iii) RD&D to develop new innovative 
solutions for electricity network operation. These case 
studies illustrate the different requirements of a range 
of technologies and are intended to demonstrate the 
criteria guiding the selection of the corresponding 
innovation projects, the allocation of funds to them, 
the sharing of their financing burden among stake-
holders and the design of public funding support.29 
Appropriate market conditions (critically, the future 
carbon price) are deemed to be in place to guarantee 
the deployment of the corresponding technologies 
once they reach maturity. Thus, the following discus-
sions, as the rest of sections in this document, focus 
on technology-push instruments. 
4.1 Case 1: First large-scale 
demonstration of the CCTS value chain
Case studies are presented in three steps. First, af-
ter a brief description of the innovation targeted, we 
discuss the rationale for public support. Second, the 
adequate type and design of direct public support are 
assessed. This also includes some first ideas on suit-
able KPIs which could be used to monitor project 
performance. Finally, we provide some insights into 
the criteria to be used to select projects targeting this 
innovation and decide on the release of public funds 
to support them. 
29 However, no analysis has been conducted to determine 
the social value of the corresponding technologies, and so no fi-
nal conclusions are drawn on the advisability of supporting or 
pursuing these technologies, on the optimal number of parallel 
research paths to pursue, or the optimal allocation of funds be-
tween projects and/or priority actions. Such analyses clearly fall 
outside the scope of this project.
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4.1.1 Description and rationale for public 
support
Interesting features of this case study include the fol-
lowing:
— Significant capital investments are needed (these 
are billion euro projects);
— This is a clear example of the non-linear nature of 
innovation. A significant amount of R&D is need-
ed to make this technology cost competitive once 
it has been demonstrated; and
— It represents the combination of several technolo-
gies within the same project. However, the exploi-
tation of CCTS plants is not dependent on the 
availability of any outside technology, nor does 
any other new technology depend on the avail-
ability of CCTS.
Furthermore, decisions on the funding of CCTS dem-
onstration projects have to be taken now to meet EU 
2050 goals. EU investments in CCTS research pro-
jects amounted to €296 million in 2007 (EC, 2009c) 
with public funding representing 19% of this (6% EU 
funds such as FP6, 13% from the Member States). 
Compared to other low-C technologies this is a rela-
tively low share of public funds. However, CCTS has 
become a priority area for RD&D only recently and 
even though large-scale value chains including car-
bon capture from the power sector are still in the de-
veloping phase, most underlying technical processes 
are already rather well proven. 
The Industrial Initiative for CCTS has specified two 
strategic mid-term objectives: to enable the cost 
competitive deployment of CCTS after 2020 and to 
further develop the technologies to enable their ap-
plication in all carbon-intensive industrial sectors. 
The first Implementation Plan (ZEP, 2010) specifies 
a number of related actions. These include (i) mak-
ing the final investment decisions for up to 12 CCTS 
demonstration projects including capture, transport 
and storage, (ii) establishing a network for knowledge 
sharing, and (iii) coordinating R&D activities ad-
dressing the commercialization of new technologies 
by reducing costs. There are a small number of Euro-
pean pilot projects focusing on different capture and 
storage technologies (i.e. between initial engineering 
work and full-scale CCTS demonstration). In con-
trast, there are more than 30 proposed large-scale 
demonstration projects including capture, transpor-
tation and storage. Besides R&D concerning the im-
provement of technological processes, these are the 
major priority for the near-term. 
CCTS is presently at the demonstration (and hence 
still pre-deployment) stage and so future profits from 
successful deployment cannot be relied upon, since 
they are subject to numerous risks. CCTS demonstra-
tion plants will earn market revenues from the elec-
tricity sold and the reduction in the number of allow-
ances they need compared to unabated coal plants. 
However, these revenues are deemed to be far too low 
to recover the investment costs of these projects. Ex-
pectations about future market profits from deploy-
ment are indirectly captured in the alleged willing-
ness of companies to co-fund demonstration projects 
in order to acquire IPR or other know-how and to 
better position their company in the future market 
place. Co-funding by the public sector is deemed to 
be necessary due to the large uncertainties that ex-
ist about the time when revenues from these projects 
will raise above costs.
4.1.2 Adequate type and design of public 
support
As discussed in Chapter 3, variables characterizing 
the innovation process should influence the choice of 
support mechanism. This case study addresses the first 
large-scale demonstration of a technology. Hence, there 
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is a low risk of technological failure, though significant 
R&D is still needed to reduce costs and increase the 
efficiency of the process. The potential future market 
size for this technology is strongly determined by the 
carbon and coal price trajectories and the development 
of the costs of competing low-C technologies. The in-
novation targeted is based on the integration of a num-
ber of technically proven processes. Thus, it is deemed 
to be incremental. Investments involved in this inno-
vation process are relatively cost intensive (according 
to (ZEP, 2010), in the range of about € 1bn). Entities 
deemed to participate in the demonstration of these 
plants provide deregulated services.
This characterization of the innovation allows us now 
to determine its support needs. The size of financ-
ing gap to be covered using public funds is relatively 
large. CCTS plants will make revenues for electricity 
sold. It is not advisable to provide support payments 
to encourage the massive deployment of this technol-
ogy since it is still in the pre-deployment stage so it 
is not yet mature enough to be deployed at scale. Net 
revenues will be higher than those of conventional 
plants due to the reduction in the number of allow-
ances CCTS plants need compared to unabated coal 
plants. Expected market revenues, which vary with 
the CO2 price, are nevertheless deemed to be too 
low to recover investment costs. This technology has 
a very high cost compared to other clean and more 
mature technologies. Thus, it cannot compete at ad-
equate commercializable demonstration scale (300+ 
MW) with the latter for funds allocated by private 
parties (where private funders tend to prefer to back 
nearer-to-the-market or cheaper options). The likeli-
hood that the support for this technology will be cut 
off is low, since this technology is likely to be part of 
the future technology mix implemented to achieve 
long-term energy policy objectives. Finally, the dem-
onstration of CCTS plants typically will be carried 
out by large companies and incumbents.
Public loans alone are unable to cover the existing 
large financing gap. As innovators will be large com-
panies (and plants are not yet commercially profita-
ble), public equity is also unattractive. Tax credits are 
similarly unsuitable while prizes only provide strong 
enough incentives for cheaper innovations. That 
leaves subsidies as the most suitable form of support 
in the form of either grants or contracts. EU grants 
should encourage co-funding from Member States. 
Besides providing funding support, regulatory ob-
stacles need to be removed to initiate the start-up of 
planned industry activities within this field.
Funds should be provided sequentially with a certain 
share up-front to alleviate liquidity and commitment 
problems. Up front payments should be returnable 
if the project is not started by a target date because 
of failures on the part of the company. An additional 
share of funds should be released on the completion 
of certain project work packages on time and the 
fulfilment of technical requirements. The remainder 
fraction should be proportional to agreed outputs 
(CO2 stored). Table 3 proposes various possible Key 
Performance Indicators to measure project perfor-
mance. This list may be exhaustive, but not all KPIs 
should necessarily be used, given the need for balanc-
ing the costs and benefits of monitoring.
4.1.3 Project selection and provision of funds 
CCTS demonstration requires high up-front invest-
ments and its aim is to explore a range of options for 
capture and also transport and storage, indicating the 
need for coordination in allocating funds. The EC – 
in cooperation with the Member States – must play 
an important role in deciding which projects to back 
as well as the amount of funds provided and financ-
ing policies applied, thus allowing appropriate target-
ing of options. Competition for funds is possible as 
there are several proposals to demonstrate most of 
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the technical options. Competition should increase 
efficiency, reduce funding costs and increase the 
probability of public authorities choosing the best 
projects. Technical objectives to be reached (e.g. share 
of CO2 captured, post-capture efficiency of electric-
ity generation) should be (and are) specified ex-ante. 
The aim should be to maximize the range of learning 
from the portfolio given the extent and willingness of 
Member States’ contributions. As the projects involve 
distinct technologies (capture, transport and storage), 
different companies will need to work together and a 
large part of the learning will comprise finding out 
how best to achieve this and at what cost and with 
what preferred solutions. Disseminating the results 
of this knowledge discovery should be a key criterion 
for making public funds available, in order to accel-
erate the decarbonization of international electricity 
markets. If continued public support seems justified 
once this first generation of large-scale demonstra-
tion value chains is operating, it can be more narrow-
ly targeted at the most successful options.
4.2 Case 2: R&D on the design of new 
PV materials
4.2.1 Description and rationale for public sup-
port
Interesting features of the case study on the R&D of 
the design of new PV materials include the following:
— This innovation mainly involves undertaking ear-
ly-stage research activities. Therefore, knowledge 
to be obtained is radically new.
— As a consequence, there is high uncertainty about 
the outcome of the project and its probability of 
success.
Solar PV is expected to contribute up to 12% of Eu-
ropean electricity supply by 2020 (EC, 2009b). A total 
amount of €384 million was invested in PV-related re-
search projects in 2007 with public funding accounting 
for 42% (of which 7% came from the EU, e.g. FP6, and 
35% from Member States).30 The solar PV Industrial 
Initiative specifies two main strategic objectives for the 
mid-term: the improvement of the technology’s com-
petitiveness and its integration into the electricity grid. 
30 Countries where solar PV has been deployed at large 
scale, such as Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands, pro-
vide most of public funds. Despite the limited deployment of the 
technology in the UK, this country’s public R&D investments are 
relatively high as well (EC, 2009c).
Table 3. Suitable KPIs [case study 1]
Performance of project output (technology) Performance of support instrument applied 
KPIs to measure Primary objective: demonstration of the technology 
within time meeting technical objectives
Technical sub-objectives: amount of CO
2
 captured; 
average level of plant production; net efficiency of 
power plants
Construction within time and budget
Time necessary to apply for and receive grant (fund 
management)
Ratio of public over private funds
Frequency and timing of as-
sessment 
Primary objective: ex-post
Technical sub-objectives: intermediate and final 
measurement (e.g. every 1-2 years during the 
construction; at start-up of the project; ex-post 
measurement of CO
2
 capture rate annually)
Ex-ante anticipation and ex-post measurement of 
realization
Time and budget control continuously
Computation methodology Direct measurement Direct measurement 
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Related actions include (i) a longer-term R&D pro-
gramme to enhance the energy yield and reduce cost 
and (ii) development and demonstration programmes 
to achieve the uptake of PV-generation. Within the 
first action, this case study focuses on early research in 
the design of new PV materials.
As it is typical for early-stage research, there is sub-
stantial uncertainty about the outcome of R&D ac-
tivities addressed with respect to both their technical 
feasibility and the future competitiveness of technolo-
gies building on the respective new technological op-
tions. Thus, even when investment costs are deemed 
to be low, this innovation probably needs to receive 
some sort of public funding support in order to be 
undertaken.
4.2.2 Adequate type and design of public 
support
As explained above, this case study addresses very 
early-stage R&D, which naturally involves a high 
technological risk. Investment needs for this kind of 
radical innovation are low compared to other innova-
tion processes in low-C technologies. The adaptation 
of existing technologies in PV panels might be neces-
sary in order to build those using new PV materials. 
Innovating entities operate in deregulated activities. 
Based on its features, we can now determine the type 
of direct support required by this process. The size of 
financing gap to be covered is relatively high, despite 
the fact that investments required are relatively low. 
This is due to the significant uncertainty faced by in-
vestors about the project outcomes. This technology 
is not able to compete with others for public funds in 
the market because it is quite immature (the produc-
tion of new materials is being researched and there-
fore technologies using them are deemed not to be 
cost competitive). There is a strong likelihood that the 
support for this technology will be cut off. Existing 
uncertainties about R&D outcomes imply that there 
is still a high probability of failure in the sense of not 
reaching techno-economic objectives and needing to 
terminate R&D activities and cut off support. This in-
novation is likely to be carried out by SMEs, e.g. spe-
cialized solar PV firm or research institution. 
Public loans are not appropriate given the high risk 
that the innovator would be unable to pay them back 
(being a small entity). Tax credits are equally inappro-
priate given the low chance of taxable profits. Public 
equity can be a suitable form of public support in this 
case.31 It should be able to engage innovators in early 
inexpensive innovation work that could result in sig-
nificant profits if successful, with a consequent return 
to the funding body. Public equity furthermore might 
attract third investors. It may be preferable for the 
public funds to be given to a professional venture cap-
ital firm that in turn invests them in the equity of en-
tities undertaking promising research. Conventional 
subsidies should be avoided if possible because they 
are more expensive for the public sector than equity 
investments. Prizes may also be a suitable option if 
research to be conducted is quite cheap, since they are 
well suited to induce very low-cost early innovation 
activities by small innovating entities. 
There is a high risk of project failure (high uncertainty 
about its output) and so support cannot be made con-
ditional on reaching technical objectives. That does 
not rule out making funding dependent on the will-
ingness of other investors to co-fund or share equity 
in the project. Support for subsequent stages could 
be contingent on the success in the previous stage, 
31 Under FP7, the European Investment Fund  manages 
the ‘High Growth and Innovative SME Facility’ (GIF), which 
provides venture capital to SMEs investing in clean technology 
innovations. Thereby, ‘GIF 1’ is targeting early-stage investments 
and could be an interesting tool to support this type of innovation 
project.
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possibly providing additional equity at each success-
ful milestone. A tentative list of KPIs to be used to 
measure the performance of this project s provided 
in Table 4. 
4.2.3 Project selection and provision of funds
R&D in the design of new solar PV materials may 
produce knowledge that could assist many companies 
across the EU, justifying a significant share of public 
support from EU funds. ESII (2010) proposes a fund-
ing ratio of 60% from the EU and 40% from Member 
States for pre-competitive research. For demonstra-
tion activities that are nearer to the market, Member 
States shall take more responsibility and the funding 
ratio could be EU/MS: 40/60. This ratio is recom-
mended to increase even further in favour of MS sup-
port for deployment, i.e. EC/MS: 20/80, presumably 
on the grounds that the locally based companies will 
reap a larger share of the benefits as the technology 
becomes more mature and market ready. 
Given that the level of support required is relatively 
modest, funding decisions could be devolved to the 
Member States. As it is early-stage high-risk research, 
competition for funds among parallel research paths 
is highly recommended in order to increase the prob-
ability of publicly supporting the most promising 
R&D projects. This might suggest a degree of coor-
dination between Member States to ensure adequate 
portfolio diversity. 
4.3 Case 3: RD&D to develop 
innovative solutions for electricity 
network operation
4.3.1 Description and rationale for public 
support
Most relevant features of this case study include the 
following:
- This is a clear example of process innovation; i.e. 
the implementation of a new concept or solu-
tion to improve the functioning of the system (in 
this case the grid). The aim of this innovation is 
to facilitate the integration of RES and demand, 
not through the development of a new product, 
but by enabling the use of technologies that make 
the network smarter and more robust, and hence 
facilitate the deployment of other low-C technolo-
gies on the supply and demand side;
- Innovators participating in this project are largely 
also the users of the project outcome (distribution 
Table 4. Suitable KPIs [case study 2]
Performance of project output (technology) Performance of support instrument applied 
KPIs to consider Number of patents produced
Level of cost-reduction 
Efficiency and lifetime of new PV material
Time to sign the contract and receive funds
R&D within time and budget
Ratio of public over private funds; level of R&D intensity 
achieved
Frequency and 
timing of assess-
ment
Assessment at the end of each stage of the innovation 
process
Ex-post assessment of progress made regarding techno-
logical features
Continuous monitoring as well as ex-post assessment of 
timing and expenses. 
Ex-ante and ex-post assessment of sharing of burden 
between private and public sector 
Computation 
Methodology
Direct measurement or bottom up depending on the KPI 
considered 
Direct measurement 
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and transmission companies); and 
- These are regulated utilities.
The European electricity network faces a huge chal-
lenge to host and balance the large – and increasing 
– amounts of electricity coming from highly variable 
renewable sources and distributed generation facili-
ties. The current rate of innovation in transmission 
and distribution networks is not enough to meet this 
challenge. The Industrial Initiative for Smart Grids 
has proposed a nine-year RD&D programme32 to ac-
celerate innovation in the development and operation 
of electricity networks, i.e. the implementation of the 
smart grid concept. Total investment needs are esti-
mated to be in the range of €2 billion (EEGI, 2010). 
Its objectives are the reduction of capital and opera-
tional network expenditures as well as achieving a 
high-quality, low-C and market-based pan-European 
electricity system (EC, 2009b). Actions required to 
achieve these objectives include (i) RD&D to develop 
new network technologies; (ii) R&D aimed at de-
veloping planning tools to help drive the long-term 
evolution of electricity networks; (iii) demonstration 
activities to support the activation of demand-side 
responses; and (iv) R&D to devise innovative market 
designs. Our third case study is related to both the 
first and third actions. It is not aimed at developing 
new network technologies but at developing and im-
plementing new network operation procedures. In 
this case, innovating entities and users of the techno-
logical solutions developed coincide. They are large 
transmission and/or distribution network operators 
and, therefore, regulated utilities.
An incentive-based remuneration scheme is deemed 
32 The EEGI program is initiated by major European 
distribution system operators (DSOs: Enel, EON, RWE, Vat-
tenfall, CEZ, Iberdrola, Edf) and transmission system operators 
(TSOs: Amprion, Elia, Red Electrica, RTE, Tennet, Transpower, 
50Hertz).
to be in place encouraging the implementation of net-
work solutions that, like those considered here, are 
potentially able to reduce the cost of the transmission 
or distribution service. However, the level of cost re-
ductions in network service provision, and therefore 
the level of increases in the revenues of network com-
panies, resulting from the implementation of network 
solutions devised here critically depend on the level 
of participation of generation and load in the active 
management of the network. Significant uncertainty 
exists about the fraction of generation and load that 
will become active, which is a source of risk that net-
work companies cannot efficiently manage. Therefore, 
project risks, and therefore also costs, should be shared 
between network companies implementing innovative 
solutions and the system (meaning its users).
4.3.2 Adequate type and design of public 
support
This case study addresses mainly development and 
demonstration activities. Capital investments re-
quired are highly dependent on the respective RD&D 
project; e.g. whether new network infrastructures are 
required or not. Revenues from the resulting inno-
vations depend on the development and use of oth-
er technologies. There is a need to make changes to 
the network as well as on load and generation sites 
to reap the potential benefits of the implementation 
of the new solution developed. Knowledge produced 
will normally build on that already available, even 
though some projects also might include radical in-
novation. As already mentioned, innovating entities 
are regulated utilities.
Based on this characterization of the process, we can 
now identify its public support needs. As already 
mentioned, market revenues from the implemen-
tation of this new network concept depend on the 
regulation adopted and the implementation of the 
http://think.eui.eu 35
Public Support for the Financing of RD&D Activities in New Clean Energy Technologies
necessary changes in demand and generation sites, 
which is highly uncertain in the short-term. Thus, the 
financing gap to cover can be deemed relatively high 
but might legitimately be charged to end consumers 
(see also the Third Energy Package; EC, 2010). The 
solution adopted can compete with others on a cost 
basis if generation, consumers and the rest of the net-
work make the changes required to fully use it. There 
is a low probability that the support for this technol-
ogy will be cut off, since the implementation of the 
network solution explored here makes use of already 
mature enough technologies so as to be used at scale. 
The innovation lies with the way these technologies 
are employed, not on the development of new tech-
nologies themselves. Entities undertaking these inno-
vations are deemed to be medium to large in size (i.e. 
typically regulated TSOs and DSOs, but also technol-
ogy solution companies).
Given the large size of the financing gap to cover and 
the fact that innovating entities involved typically 
are large and regulated utilities, public equity instru-
ments are deemed not to be appropriate. Prizes would 
require addressing cheaper innovation to be effective 
in triggering it and are unsuited to regulated utilities. 
Loans would not be able to trigger this innovation 
without some guarantee that the companies could re-
cover their costs from their regulated activities. How-
ever, rebates could successfully been applied since, 
due to the regulated nature of entities involved in this 
innovation, revenues from these rebates can be more 
easily directed to a specific type of activity (in this 
case, RD&D involving the implementation of inno-
vative network solutions). Unlike grants or contracts, 
rebates allow TSOs or DSOs to decide which techni-
cal solutions to implement, thus preventing public 
authorities from having to ‘pick winners’. Given that 
network companies have a superior knowledge on 
the challenges faced by electricity grids than public 
authorities; this is considered a good feature.33 
Network solutions to be developed face a low techni-
cal risk of failure. Only the revenues from this innova-
tion that companies may earn and keep are uncertain. 
Rebates could therefore be made conditional on the 
successful implementation of the concept developed 
(its installation and successful operation). Given that 
33 Ofgem is supporting this kind of innovation in the UK 
through the IFI and RPZ schemes. They combine the use of re-
bates involving a pass-trough to consumers of a fraction of the 
cost of this innovation with an efficiency driven regulation (RPI-
X) to encourage an efficient implementation of the solution de-
vised. Thus risks of innovation undertaken are shared between 
the innovator (network entity) and consumers. It has been quite 
effective in leveraging a significant amount of investments by net-
work companies.
Table 5. Suitable KPIs [case study 3]
Performance of project output (technology) Performance of support instrument applied
KPIs to consider KPIs still need to be defined based on a new approach to 
the estimation of the benefits of “Smart Grids” technologies
Should probably relate to the level of implementation of 
the network solution and its outcome.
Time to get approval for the project
Project within time and budget
Ratio of public over private funds; level of R&D intensity 
achieved
Frequency and 
timing of assess-
ment
Assessment both ex-ante and ex-post Regular assessment during project execution as well as 
final ex-post measurement 
Computation 
Methodology
Direct measurement Direct measurement 
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the relevant companies are large and well capitalised, 
rebates could be delayed until the investments have 
taken place and the functioning of the new network 
scheme adopted has been demonstrated. In those cas-
es where the participation of generation or demand 
in the implementation of this solution is guaranteed 
(they are encouraged to do) success could be meas-
ured in terms of the amount of generation or load in-
tegrated in the system through the new concept. 
Measuring the benefits produced by “Smart Grid” 
technologies is far from straightforward. A standard-
ized approach is needed to estimate the benefits and 
costs of Smart Grid research and demonstration pro-
jects. An initial attempt was made through the defini-
tion of KPIs proposed by the EEGI. However, further 
work is still needed to converge on a well accepted 
set of KPIs. The existing programme and project KPIs 
need to be upgraded in order to be clearly linked with 
the measurable benefits of these projects, like, for ex-
ample, the resulting increase in the capacity of the 
network to host active demand and/or low-C genera-
tion, or the reduction in the grid operation and in-
vestment costs (in line with solutions promoted for 
instance in the US; see also EPRI, 2010). Additionally, 
KPIs employed should probably measure the level of 
implementation of the network solution concerned 
including the level of use of those technologies in-
volved in it.
4.3.3 Project selection and provision of funds
RD&D projects on the implementation of new net-
work solutions could be financed from both pub-
lic (EU and MS) and private funds, as well as from 
end consumer contributions through increases in 
transmission/distribution charges. The share of EU 
funds should depend on whether innovations are to 
be applied at transmission level, where benefits real-
ized could have a very large footprint, or at distribu-
tion level, where benefits will mainly be local (EEGI, 
2010). Pooling of national and EU funds should be 
restricted to high-cost network solutions which have 
a broad application to the European grid. For other 
types of projects, competition among different solu-
tions implemented by different network operators 
should increase the number of different options ex-
plored and the resulting knowledge gained, which 
should be widely disseminated to network operator 
ex-post.
5. Conclusions and 
recommendations
Existing demand-pull measures, namely carbon pric-
ing and the Renewables Directive, will be insufficient 
to deliver an adequate and timely level of private 
RD&D in new clean energy technologies. Thus, in or-
der to reach the EU 2020 and 2050 climate objectives, 
there is a need for direct public support to innova-
tion. Public funds need to be spent wisely, given their 
limited availability. The following paragraphs provide 
guidelines on (i) how to select RD&D projects to be 
supported; (ii) how to choose among financing in-
struments; and (iii) how to frame public support to 
minimize the risk of ‘funding failure’.
R1 // There will not be sufficient funds to carry out 
all proposed actions at the described scale, scope 
and time horizons. How to allocate limited public 
funds; i.e. select projects to be supported?
— Building a balanced portfolio of technologies re-
quires supporting a balanced portfolio of innova-
tion activities comprising research, development 
and demonstration. This will support (i)  the ac-
celeration of decarbonization to reach mid-term 
2020 climate objectives by bringing to maturity 
some of those technologies that are closer to the 
market, but also (ii) the development of a diversi-
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fied technology mix enabling the achievement of 
long-term 2050 objectives, which requires fund-
ing innovation targeting immature but promising 
technologies. Given existing tight budget con-
straints, project selection should be based on one 
single evaluation criterion, namely the expected 
overall reduction in CO2 emissions over both time 
horizons per euro of support provided.
 More mature technologies with a large expected 
potential need to be brought to competitiveness 
quickly. The allocation of funds among technolo-
gies and within Technology Roadmaps should be 
based on detailed quantitative cost-benefit analy-
ses building on objective estimates of success 
probabilities and CO2 saving potentials realized 
once the technologies reach deployment. Regular 
updates of the allocation of available funds within 
allocation periods, taking into account knowl-
edge gains, are important. Immature technologies, 
require continuity in the research strategy. Pro-
ject evaluation typically will be based on ordinal 
rankings taking into account that early research 
mainly generates options for new low-C technolo-
gies. Therefore, very high predicted CO2 saving 
potentials in the case of successful innovation can 
support the acceptance of very low success prob-
abilities and/or delays in the achievement of tech-
nological milestones. 
 As the probability of success increases, funds 
should be more concentrated and competition 
among alternative research paths becomes less rel-
evant. Cooperation among innovators (including 
competition among consortia) might facilitate the 
undertaking of high-cost projects and avoid costly 
duplication of RD&D focusing on very similar 
technological principles. 
— In order to achieve the SET Plan objectives, co-
operation and coordination among Member State 
and EU support policies have to be improved. The 
joint selection of projects and allocation of their 
financial burden is especially relevant for highly 
immature (i.e. highly risky) and capital-intensive 
projects (e.g. nuclear fusion). The EU added value, 
cost and uncertainty about returns of projects are 
the major criteria determining the appropriate 
burden sharing among EU, Member States and 
private investors. In those technology areas where 
joint programming is not possible, the EU should 
act as a residual funder with Member States pro-
viding a detailed mapping of national RD&D ac-
tivities and support programmes employed.
 The initiation of European Energy Research Alli-
ances – aimed at realizing pan-European RD&D 
by pooling and integrating activities and resourc-
es, combining national and EU sources – is a step 
into the right direction. Their successful imple-
mentation should be fostered and progress moni-
tored.
R2 // How to choose among available financing in-
struments?
— Policy makers should select and design financ-
ing instruments such that they directly support 
the achievement of policy objectives. The form of 
direct public support needs to be tailored to the 
features of each innovation project. Relevant fea-
tures of innovation include (i) first and foremost, 
the size of the financing gap to close using public 
funds; (ii) the ability of the corresponding tech-
nology to compete for public funds in the market 
and, therefore, the possible need to explicitly tar-
get it (which is possible using public loans/guar-
antees, public equity, subsidies in the form of priz-
es, grants or contracts); (iii) the probability that 
public funds have to be (re-)directed to alternative 
innovation projects (e.g. public loans have a low 
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flexibility in redirecting funds whereas subsidies 
in the form of benefits related to RD&D invest-
ments are more flexible); and (iv) the type of inno-
vating entity that is likely to conduct the targeted 
innovation.
— Financing instruments selected should maximize 
the amount of socially valuable RD&D subject to 
the public sector’s funding by leveraging private 
sector funding as far as possible within each stage 
of project maturity. Loans are well suited to finance 
lower cost, potentially profitable pre-deployment 
innovation carried out by large companies. Pub-
lic loans should be used instead of private loans if 
the liquidity of the capital market is low or if the 
innovation targeted is related to activities where 
the public sector is more experienced (e.g. RD&D 
in nuclear). Public loans are also attractive in re-
cessions, when the private appetite for risk is un-
duly depressed. Public equity is suitable to finance 
risky, potentially highly profitable, innovation 
preferably undertaken by small entities. Public eq-
uity investments should be of modest size, though 
they may be used to marginally fund expensive in-
novation to signal that it has a high potential. Priz-
es can be used to fund early low-cost innovation 
preferably conducted by universities and research 
institutes, though they may be received both by 
small and large entities. Tax credits and rebates for 
private innovation are best suited to supporting 
near-market, incremental innovation conducted 
by large companies. Input driven grants and con-
tracts should only be awarded to socially desirable 
clean energy innovation that would not be under-
taken otherwise, which includes a large number of 
early stage, capital intensive processes, as well as 
pre-deployment innovation activities conducted 
by regulated entities. Rebates on investments may 
also be useful to support a significant amount of 
innovation conducted by these entities. Output-
driven conventional subsidies should be used to 
fund closer to the market innovation where risk of 
project failure is low.
R3 // Financing instruments need to be implement-
ed in a way that encourages efficiency while not dis-
couraging participation by the private sector. How 
to design public support to minimize the risk of 
‘funding failure’?
— Use competition for funds whenever possible in 
order to first, set incentives for high efficiency in 
RD&D and, second, minimize public interven-
tion. The public sector should avoid having to 
identify ‘winning technological options’ whenever 
possible and instead leave these decisions to the 
private sector.
— Public funding should be output-driven whenever 
this is compatible with the engagement of innova-
tors in the RD&D addressed. This involves mak-
ing the release of funds and their amount condi-
tional on performance. Project progress needs to 
be monitored using carefully designed Key Per-
formance Indicators. Funds should be provided 
either ex-post after a project’s successful conclu-
sion or sequentially based on the achievement of 
intermediate objectives. This allows for early ter-
mination if the project is not delivering expected 
results or for a re-orientation in objectives or re-
search strategy if that raises the success probabil-
ity. However, the presence of high project costs 
may require releasing at least part of the funds up-
front. 
— The institutions set up to allocate funds to clean 
energy RD&D should be lean and flexible enough 
to avoid institutional inertia and lock-in. The risk 
of financial lock-in is especially high for technolo-
gies of a low maturity.
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Annexes
Annex A: Data on RD&D in low-carbon technologies
Figure 3. Aggregate EU Member States public R&D funding (excl EU funds)
Figure 4. R&D in SET Plan sectors in relation to generation and consumption by member state.
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ANNEX B: Designing the SET Plan 
funding allocation
The expert committee has identified a preliminary 
allocation of funds to the designated technologies, 
after applying the following selection criteria: (i) EU 
added value/additionality; (ii) willingness of actors to 
join forces; (iii) potential market penetration of the 
technology in different time horizons; as well as (iv) 
potential contribution to CO2 reduction, security of 
energy supply, and competitiveness.
The key technologies/sectors identified and the annual 
average amounts of funding currently allocated and 
proposed for the next ten years are shown in Table 6.
Table 6: Current funding and estimated financing needs for key SET Plan technologies  
Private EU MS Estimated for next 10 years Justification
Million € in 2007 Billion €
Hydrogen/ fuel cells 380 70 170 5
Updated estimation of resources needed made by stake-
holders – ‘Implementation Plan’ of the hydrogen and fuel 
cell technology platform (Study by the JRC)
Wind 290 11 80 5.5
Estimation of resources needed made by stakeh. –Cost-
ing of the Wind Industrial Initiative
Solar PV/ CSP 270 32 170 16
Estimation of resources needed made by stakeh. –Cost-
ing of the Solar Industrial Initiative
CCS 230 17 40 10.5-16.5
Estimation of resources needed made by stakeh. –Cost-
ing of the CCS EII (including the 7-12 B€ CCS demonstra-
tion projects - Study by McKinsey)
Biofuels 270 13 65 8.5
Estimation of resources needed made by stakeh.–Costing 
of the Bio-fuels Industrial Initiative
Electricity grids 210 14 50 2
Estimation of resources needed made by stakeh. for 
transmission and by EC for distribution – Costing of the 
Smart Grid Industrial Initiative
Smart cities 10-12
Estimation based on experience from CIVITAS and CON-
CERTO initiatives and reviewed by the JRC
EERA 5
Estimation of resources needed made by the Commis-
sion in consultation with EERA – Based on input from 
EERA assuming that 30% of their future activities are 
jointly planned and implemented.
Nuclear fission 205 5 250 5-10
Estimation of resources needed made by stakeh. –Cost-
ing of the Nuclear fission Industrial Initiative
Nuclear fusion 0 204 280 - -
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ANNEX C: SET Plan European Industrial Initiatives
Table 7. SET Plan European Industrial Initiatives
EEI Solar PV Solar CSP Electricity Networks (Smart Grids)
Strategic 
objective EII   
                                             
Improve competitiveness, ensure sustainability of technology, facilitate large-scale 
penetration (Solar PV)  
Demonstrate competitiveness and readiness for mass deployment of advanced CSP 
plants through scaling-up of the most promising technologies to pre-commercial or 
commercial level (Solar CSP)
To transmit and distribute up to 35% of electricity from 
dispersed and concentrated renewable sources by 2020 
and a completely decarbonizesd electricity production by 
2050, to integrate national networks into a market-based 
truly pan-European network
State of the 
art 
Small scale: Commercialized; large scale: Development; thin films: Develop-
ment (state in 2007)
Long overhead lines: centralized network control (2007)
Current mar-
ket share
0.1% of electricity demand (2007)  
3.4GWp Installed Capacity (2006)
75-85% of generation at transmission level (2007)
Projections 
(by 2020)
12% of electricity demand 3% of electricity demand ./.
Inv. needs 
(2010-20)
16 billion Euro 2 billion Euro
Industrial 
sector ob-
jectives EII
Establish PV as a clean, 
competitive and sustain-
able energy technology
To demonstrate competitiveness and readiness for mass 
deployment of advanced CSP; to contribute around 3% of 
European electricity supply by 2020 with a potential of at 
least 10% by 2030 (if DESERTEC)
To substantially reduce capital and operational expendi-
ture for the operation of the networks while fulfilling the 
objectives of a high-quality, low-carbon, pan-European, 
market based electricity system
Technology 
objectives 
EII
1) PV 
Systems to 
enhance 
the energy 
yield and 
reduce costs      
(further 
develop and 
demonstrate 
advanced 
manu-
facturing 
processes)
2) Integration 
of PV-
generated 
electricity                
(develop 
and validate 
innovative, 
economic 
and sustain-
able PV ap-
plications)
1) Reduction 
of gen-
eration, O&M 
costs 
(To develop 
advanced 
plant 
monitoring 
and control 
technolo-
gies)
2) Improve-
ment of 
operational 
flexibility 
and energy 
dispatch-
ability 
(To develop 
and improve 
thermal 
energy stor-
age)
3) Improve-
ment in the 
environm. 
and water-
use footprint 
(To dem-
onstrate 
CSP-specific 
sustain-
able water 
desalination 
processes)
4) Advanced 
concepts & 
designs
1) Develop-
ing and 
validating 
advanced 
network 
techn. to 
improve 
flexibility 
and network 
security and 
to mitigate 
future 
CAPEX/OPEX
2) Prepar-
ing the 
long-term 
evolution of 
electric-
ity grids 
to ensure 
the proper 
investments
3) Engaging 
the active 
participation 
of customers 
in energy 
markets and 
energy ef-
ficiency
4) Elaborat-
ing and 
testing inno-
vative market 
designs 
Related ac-
tions EII
(1) col-
laborative 
technological 
development 
programme 
focused on 
enhancing 
performance 
and lifetime, 
manufactur-
ing process 
develop-
ment to 
address twin 
challenges 
of PV device 
innovation            
(2) 
longer-term 
research 
programme 
(1) technol-
ogy develop-
ment and 
demonstra-
tion pro-
gramme for  
Building-In-
tegrated PV, 
stand-alone 
and large 
ground-
based PV 
systems                       
(2) Introduc-
tion of new 
storage tech-
nologies in 
pilot units for 
large-scale 
field trials  
R&D & dem-
onstration 
programme 
to address 
individual 
components 
as well as the 
overall con-
version ef-
ficiency and 
to reduce 
investment 
cost
R&D and 
demon-
stration 
programme 
addressing 
thermal 
energy stor-
age and CSP 
plant hybridi-
zation
R&D and 
demon-
stration 
programme 
addressing 
water cool-
ing needs, 
dry cooling, 
water desali-
nation and 
purification
A longer-
term R&D 
programme 
aimed at sup-
porting the 
longer-term 
CSP industry 
development
(1) RD&D 
to validate 
state-of-the-
art power 
techn. from 
offshore 
sources and 
to develop 
new control 
systems to 
ensure in-
tegration of 
large RES and 
to operate 
pan-Europe-
an nets 
(2) Demo 
activities for 
automating 
distribution 
network 
control and 
operation
R&D 
activities 
to develop  
modeling 
and planning 
tools for the 
long-term 
evolution of 
the grid
Demonstra-
tion activities 
on different 
solutions 
to activate 
demand 
response 
for energy 
saving
R&D 
activities on 
cross-cutting 
issues to 
proposing 
market 
designs that 
provide 
incentives for 
all actors to 
contribute to 
the overall 
efficiency
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EII Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Nuclear
Strategic 
objective EII                     
                                                                                          
Expected to play an important role in achieving EU vision of reducing 
GHG emissions by 60-80% by 2050
A vast increase in the sustainability of nuclear energy through demon-
strating the technical, industrial and economic viability of Generation-IV 
fast neutron reactors, thereby ensuring that nuclear energy can remain 
a long-term contributor to the low carbon economy and building on 
the safety, reliability and competitiveness of current reactors
State of the art Large scale transport of hydrogen is already commercialised (2009) 
Large scale hydrogen production: commercialized or under develop-
ment (2007) 
Small scale hydrogen: demonstration/commercialized (2007) 
Fuel cells: demonstration (2007)
Nuclear Fission:  Gen-III: Mature technology; Gen-IV: depends on 
concept. Basic research still required for all designs leading to strategic 
decisions by 2012 at the latest. First of a kind and demo plants (VHTR 
and SFR) by 2020 
Nuclear Fusion: Committed construction of ITER as prototypic experi-
ment aimed at demonstrating the technological feasibility of fusion 
energy
Current market 
share
Null Nuclear Fission (31% of demand in 2009 ~ 135 GWe installed capacity) 
Nuclear Fusion (None market share - needing another 30-40 years to 
reach maturity)
Projections                            
                                                                                      
(by 2020)
Max. estimated market share of H2 vehicles in EU-27 up to 1.4% in 2020 
and 12% in 2030; by 2020, mass market roll-out expected to be kick-
started in transport sector; by then, 1-5 mn vehicles would be on the 
road with plus 0.4 to 1.8 mn vehicles/a; 8 to 16 GWe would be produced 
by CHP fuel cells
The installed capacity of nuclear fission power for the EU-27, with 
respect to the baseline, is: 115 GWe in 2020 and 100 GWe in 2030
Investment 
needs  
(2010-2020)
470 million Euro 5 - 10 billion Euro
Industrial sec-
tor objectives 
EII
To develop and validate efficient and cost-competitive technologies for 
various applications
To enable the commercial deployment of Generation-IV FNRs from 
2040, while in the meantime maintaining at least a 30% share of EU 
electricity
Technology 
objectives EII
1) Technology 
development 
with focus on 
cost reduction
2) Design and 
implement a 
technology 
specific support 
framework for 
hydrogen & 
3) Planning and 
financing of 
infrastructure 
build-up & large 
scale demon-
stration project
4) Pre-commer-
cial technology 
refinement & 
market prepara-
tion
1) Through 
design, con-
struction and 
operation of 
a prototype 
sodium fast 
reactor
2) The refurbish-
ment and/
or design, 
construction 
and operation 
of infrastruc-
tures needed 
to support the 
design and/
or operation of 
prototype and 
demonstrator 
FNRs
3) Supporting 
infrastructures 
for prototype 
and demon-
strator
4) R&D support-
ing all aspects 
of the design, 
construction 
and operation of 
the prototype, 
demonstrator 
and support 
infrastructure
Related actions 
EII
    (1) Design, 
construction 
and operation of 
a prototype  SFR 
coupled to grid 
(2) Finalise 
design and 
obtain a license 
for construction 
of SFR prototype 
(250-600 MWe), 
startup by 2020
Design, con-
struction and 
operation of a 
demonstrator 
(not coupled to 
the grid) 
of alternative 
technology, 
either gas or 
lead cooled fast 
reactor (GFR or 
LFR)
(1) Supporting 
infrastructures 
for prototype 
and demonstra-
tor (2) Design, 
construct or 
upgrade a 
consistent suite 
of experimental 
facilities for 
component 
design,
Basic and ap-
plied research to 
support the ac-
tivities foreseen 
in the actions 
above
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EII
Wind CCS
Strategic 
objective EII                     
                                                                                          
To improve the competitiveness of wind energy technologies, enable the exploita-
tion of offshore resources and deep waters potential, and facilitate grid integration 
of wind power
Demonstrate the commercial viability of CCS 
technologies in an economic environment 
driven by the EU-ETS
State of the art Onshore wind = mature technology (ongoing R&D efforts primarily focused on 
maximising the value of wind energy and taking the technology offshore; main tech-
nological development in recent years is a trend towards ever larger wind turbines) 
Pulverized coal (state-of-the-art 45% 
efficiency),GTCC (efficiencies 57%-60%); 
capture technology is at an advanced stage 
of research; large scale transport of CO
2
 using 
pipelines commercialised in N. America; indus-
trial CO
2
 storage operational around the world 
(~3 Mt of CO
2
 p.a.)
Current market 
share
Installed capacity in the EU is about 50 GW, contributing 3% to European gross 
electricity consumption 
0
Projections                            
                                                                                      
(by 2020)
Capacities for EU-27 in the baseline are 120 GW in 2020 and 148 GW in 2030; esti-
mated max. potential is up to 180 GW by 2020 and 300 GW by 2030 representing 
~11 (18) % of projected EU gross electricity consumption by 2020 (2030)
From the technology point of view, ZEP plants 
can be commercialised as of 2020, with first-of-
a-kind plants coming into operation by 2015; 
estimated max. potential in EU-27: up to 190 
GW by 2030 (represents ~32% of projected EU 
gross electricity consumption)
Total invest-
ment needs  
(2010-2020)
~ 6 billion € 10.5-16.5 billion €
Industrial sec-
tor objectives 
EII
To enable a 20% share of wind energy in the final EU electricity consumption by 
2020
./. ./.
Technology 
objectives EII
1) New turbines and 
components  
(to lower investment 
and O&M costs)
2) Offshore technology 
(focus on large-scale 
turbines and deep 
water technologies)
3) Grid integration 
(i.e. techniques for 
large-scale penetra-
tion of variable supply)
4) Resource assess-
ment and spatial 
planning 
(to support deploy-
ment)
1) Providing the tech-
nical and economic 
feasibility of CCS using 
existing technologies 
(i.e. test fully inte-
grated value chains at 
large scale; reduction 
of costs)
2) Developing more 
efficient and cost 
competitive CCS 
technologies (i.e. 
improve efficiency of 
power plants, develop 
new capture concepts 
and technologies for 
transport and storage; 
expand use of CCS to 
other sectors)
Related ac-
tions EII
(1) R&D program fo-
cusing on new turbine 
designs, materials, etc. 
(on-/offshore) + dem-
onstration program for 
10-20 MW turbines; 
(2) Network of 5-10 
European testing 
facilities; 
(3) Cooperation 
and demonstration 
program
(1) Development 
and demonstration 
program (at least 4 
structure concepts); 
(2) Demonstration 
program on advanced 
mass-manufacturing 
processes
Demonstration pro-
gram focusing on wind 
farm management 
as VPPs
R&D program for fore-
casting distribution 
of wind speeds and 
energy production
Realization of 8 to 12 
large-scale demonstra-
tion programs (incl. 
capture, transport and 
storage); 
Establishment of a 
network (knowledge 
sharing, joint activities)
Establishment of 
an R&D program 
addressing i) im-
provement of  fossil 
fuel power plant ef-
ficiency, ii) improve-
ment of capture 
process efficiency, 
iii) transport and 
storage concepts, 
iv) use of CCS in 
other industrial 
sectors  
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EII Bio-Energy Smart Cities
Strategic 
objective EII                     
                                                                                          
Address techno-economic barriers to further development and acceler-
ated commercial deployment of bioenergy conversion techn. 
Demonstrate feasibility of rapidly progressing towards the energy and 
climate objectives at a local level while proving to citizens that their 
quality of life and local economies can be improved through invest-
ments in energy efficiency and reduction of carbon emissions 
State of the art Biomass already used in CHP (increasing importance), biofuels used  
Current market 
share
Almost 4% of the EU gross energy demand covered by biomass; in 2005, 
~5% of the biomass consumption for energy purposes was dedicated to 
biofuel production (about 4 Mt)
./.
Projections (by 
2020)
Biomass CHP in EU-27: up to 42 GWe by 2020 and 52 GWe by 2030 
(would generate ~4.7 (5.3) % of projected EU gross electricity cons.
;                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Biofuels in EU-27 transport (baseline): 7.5% in 2020 and 9.5% in 2030; 
max. estimated market share are up to 14% in 2020 and 20% in 2030
./.
Inv. needs 
(2010-2020)
~ 9 billion € 10-12 billion €
Industrial sec-
tor objectives 
EII
To ensure at least 14% bioenergy in EU energy mix by 2020 ./.
Technology 
objectives EII
1) Bring to commercial 
maturity the cur-
rently most promising 
technologies and 
value chains (i.e. 
advanced biofuels and 
heat&power)
2) Activities in biomass 
feedstock availability 
assessment, produc-
tion, management and 
harvesting
3) Longer-term R&D 
program
1) Buildings 
- New buildings 
with net zero energy 
requirements or net 
zero carbon emissions 
by 2015 
- Refurbish of existing 
buildings to minimize 
energy consumption 
maintaining or increas-
ing performance and 
comfort
2) Energy networks 
Heating/cooling:  
- Innovative and cost 
effective biomass, 
solar thermal and geo-
thermal applications 
- Innovative hybrid 
heating and cooling 
systems   
Electricity: 
- Smart grids, Smart 
metering and energy 
management systems, 
Smart appliances 
- To foster local RES 
electricity production
3) Transport 
- 10-20 testing and 
deployment programs 
for low carbon 
public transport and 
individual transport 
systems 
- Sustainable mobility
Related actions 
EII
Optimization of 
most promising 
value chains within a) 
thermo-chemical (2-4 
demonstration and 
10-15 first-of this-kind 
industrial size plants 
and b) bio-chemical 
pathways (5-8D, 4-7F
)                                   -> 
technology pathways 
and value chains see 
detailed table (incl. 
estimated number of 
pilot, demonstration 
etc. plants)
Assessment of 
biomass availability; 
development/ optimi-
zation of technolo-
gies and logistics for 
sustainable produc-
tion, management & 
harvesting (2-3 Pilot 
plants, 1 demonstra-
tion plant)
Construction of pilot 
and demonstration 
plants ~2018 -> iden-
tification of new value 
chains, exploitation 
of new raw materials 
(1-2P, 1-2 D)
(a) Test 100 new 
residential and 100 
new non-residential 
buildings for different 
design options for 
zero energy buildings 
in different climatic 
zones 
(b) Test and assess 
through 5-10 pro-
grammes, strategies 
for the refurbishment 
of at least 50% of exist-
ing public buildings 
(c) Test and assess 
through 5-10 pro-
grammes, strategies 
for the complete 
refurbishment of 50% 
of all existing buildings 
Heating/cooling:  
5-10 demo pro-
grammes for large 
deployment of RES 
heating/cooling in cit-
ies supplying 50 % of 
heat/cooling demand 
from RES 
5-10 demo pro-
grammes for large 
scale RES heating/
cooling integration in 
energy efficient build-
ings in pioneer cities 
supplying about 50% 
of the heat and cool-
ing demand from RES 
Electricity: 
Development and de-
ployment programme 
focused on high 
efficient appliances 
lighting and SM 
5-10 development 
and deployment 
programmes for smart 
grids in cities
(a) 10-20 testing 
programmes for the 
large deployment 
of alternative fuel 
vehicles including the 
fuel/energy supply 
infrastructure  
(b) Development and 
testing programmes 
focused on sustainable 
mobility
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ANNEX D: Allocating funds to low-carbon R&D projects
       
 
  

          
           
             
              
              
     
              
            
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           
      
           
     

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ANNEX E: Valuing low-carbon R&D
    
 
  

            
            
           
              
            
      
            
             
             
            
            
    
               
              
              

               
                 
             
      
                  


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              
             
             
                 
                
                
             
                
 
             
                   
                
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              
                 
               
                  
                 
              
               
              
      
                
                
                    
               
              
            
               
            
              
               
              
               
                  
  

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                   
              
              
            
                
              
   
                
              
                 
              
               
                
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                 
               
                 
               
             
                 
                
        
                 
                  
                   
                 
                
              
                 
               
                  
             
                        
                     
       

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    
                
                
                
                
            
                  
                
        
                 
                  
                    
               
                   
            
                  
                 
 
                    
                    
             
 
            
                
               
             
            
               
                
               
               
               
               
                
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                 
         
             
                
            

          
  
           

       
         

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ANNEX F: Industrial Council Meeting 
Summary
The question to be answered
How to fund innovation (RD&D) on low carbon en-
ergy systems1 more efficiently2 to meet on EU climate 
change policy goal(s)?
A potential answer at EU level
Completing the existing industrial initiatives on low 
carbon systems as described in the SET Plan will 
require novel public/private funding mechanisms, 
which go much beyond existing FP7 mechanisms, 
thanks in particular to more coordinated MS/EU ac-
tivities.
Clarity improvements proposed for the report next 
version
The combination of all the SET Plan funding require-
ments (say 50 Billion € above what is already funded 
at MS and EU level over the next ten years) empha-
sises the needs to raise extra money (both public and 
private) if one wants to comply with the existing in-
dustrial initiatives demands. So far, most of the low 
carbon systems have coupled EC/MS and private 
funds coming from existing energy players. There 
is growing evidence that future support will require 
funding coming from non energy players, which in 
1  Technologies included are: hydrogen and fuel cells; 
wind energy; photovoltaics; carbon capture and storage; biofuels; 
smart grids and concentrating solar power.
2  The aggregated R&D spending towards selected non-
nuclear SET-Plan priority technologies amounted to €2.38 billion 
in 2006/7, out of which €1.66 billion originate from corporate 
R&D investments in 2007, while €0.57 billion stem from public 
national R&D budgets in EU Member States in 2007 and €0.16 
billion are financed through the European FP6 (see R&D invest-
ment in the priority technologies of the European strategic en-
ergy technology plan com(2009) 519)
 
turn will require innovative financial measures.
The report must therefore clarify and pinpoint:
— the scope of the technology innovation cycle ad-
dressed, making sure to cover costly large scale 
demonstrations which are needed to scale up and 
to replicate successful solutions in the energy sec-
tor,
— the specific barriers which are faced by low carbon 
energy systems (infrastructure-legal-regulatory),
— market failures at MS and EU level which justify 
the needs for public intervention (which can be 
regulatory, financial, legal…),
— the sense of tax payers (subsidies) / customer (tar-
iffs) / investor funding of climate change policies,
— the related IPR issues faced by low carbon system 
funding which can impede or accelerate the dis-
semination and use of the RD&D publicly funded 
projects: low carbon systems have a long lead time, 
with breakthrough concepts being originated quit 
often by start-ups or SMEs. They will need a strong 
IPR policy to avoid free riding from participating 
or non participating players.
— the potential sources of non energy funding 
sources (the example of British Telecom or Google 
committed to reduce the electricity demands from 
data management systems): they fund the RD&D 
to comply with their internal new requirements.
Another concept used in the initial report (matu-
rity of technology) needs to be used with caution: 
a technology is said to be “mature” within a manu-
facturer when it has reached the development break 
even point. It might be therefore very much market 
dependent (for instance, several new power technolo-
gies are mature on the Chinese market; and not yet 
mature to be implemented in European systems since 
they need more development to fit European require-
ments).
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Completeness improvements proposed for the report 
next version
The scope of the report must be extended to cover the 
following issues:
— the limited role of R&D intensity3 as an indica-
tor of innovation intensity: low carbon systems 
require system innovation with most of the value 
chain players involved in the innovation process,
— the past empirical experience on successes and 
failures at funding low carbon technologies4 (the 
case of hydrogen), including the difficult transi-
tion between public and private funding,
— the apparent low innovation investments in the 
energy sector and an explanation per activities 
(generation, infrastructure, retail),
— the funding issues, and sometimes solutions, 
based on past experimental observations:
– the innovative experience of OFGEM in the 
UK at funding electricity transmission and dis-
tribution operations,
– the lack of scalable equity on low carbon tech-
nologies when comparing Europe versus USA-
China
– the adverse or favourable role of regulations in 
attracting innovation funding,
- the ETS revenues and their potential impact 
on RD&D funding of low carbon technolo-
gies,
- the NER 300 funding measures (based on 
outputs) and its possible expansion to non 
CCS technologies,
- the role of consumer in financing directly 
innovation through adequate regulations 
3  “The Booz Allen Hamilton Global Innovation 1000: 
money isn’t everything” B.Jaruzelski, K.Dehoff, R.Bordia (2006)
4  “Innovation and Transfer of Results of energy RTD in 
national and European Community’s programmes: a comparative 
study of mechanisms, results and good practices” (2007) EC Con-
tract N.: RTD/J1/CT-2005-25
(see for instance the Third Energy Package 
recommendations to pay for innovation on 
transmission and distribution networks),
- the importance of technology portfolio 
management5 and funding measure portfo-
lio: at EU level, at MS level, their intercon-
nections (or lack of!).
- the importance of service innovation 
around low carbon technologies (where 
more than 50% of the KWh costs come from 
peripherical services involved throughout 
the value chain over the whole life cycle) 
and the lack of funding for it at MS and EU 
level, a major anticipated market failure.
Coherence improvements proposed for the report 
next version
The following issues must be addressed to make the 
final report overall more coherent.
— What are the extra needs for statistical data about 
low carbon technology innovation to design fund-
ing schemes that make sense in Europe?
— What are the other EU policies which impact low 
carbon systems funding (for instance: agriculture 
policy for biomass, waste recycling for CHP devel-
opment, regional infrastructure investments for 
electricity and heat networks) and their potential 
contribution to the funding of low carbon tech-
nologies?
— Is a mission oriented project selection and funding 
agency at EU level the appropriate instrument to 
reach a very low carbon economy by 2050 (see the 
DARPA Energy approach in the USA launched by 
President Obama)?
— What are the routes for innovation on energy 
5  “Portfolio analysis of European Community Non Nu-
clear Energy RTD projects in their overall EU context” Frost and 
Sullivan, April 2006
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regulations that can lead to private investments on 
low carbon innovation in Europe? (the early ex-
ample of Japanese car manufacturing in Europe-
a cap on the maximum Japanese cars that can be 
manufactured in Europe- pushing the European 
car industry to change its attitude toward innova-
tion for cars – early 1990’s).
Moreover, a coherent picture must be given about 
the relationship between public innovation support 
and IPR management, with a focus on dissemination 
activities in support of knowledge availability to non 
participants willing to deploy low carbon technolo-
gies.
ANNEX G: Comments by Project 
Advisors 
Project Advisor: 
Christian von Hirschhausen 
Professor at TU Berlin 
Submission date: October 2010
As one of the scientific advisors to Think on the report 
„Public Support for the Financing of RD&D Activi-
ties in New Clean Energy Technologies“ I have par-
ticipated both in the experts meeting (07 September 
2010) and in the Scientific Committee (13 October 
2010). In the following I report on the “V1”-version 
(October 2010).
Structure of the Report
The objective of the report is to investigate what are 
the most appropriate technology support tools at each 
stage of the innovation process. At present, the report 
consists of a full-fledged report, and two annexes by 
David Newbery, on a) modeling the optimal portfo-
lio approach, and b) a case study on uncertainties in 
PV. My feeling is that the lessons from these two an-
nexes should be better integrated in the main report. 
This refers both to the issue of diversification, and 
the quantitative analysis of the PV sector (the data of 
which was suggested to be updated by Doerte Fou-
quet, who wanted to provide the relevant data). The 
cost-benefit analysis on PV should also serve to carry 
out other case studies of other technologies, such as 
CCTS, which is the second major case study. If these 
case studies can be integrated, for reasons of time, in 
the report, they should be carried out by graduate 
students in a follow-up activity.
The introduction should clearly point out that the 
task of the group was very limited, e.g. the early-stage 
RD&D activities in new clean technologies. Thus, 
neither demand-side aspects, nor the setting of stand-
ards at a later stage of development, are in the core 
of the report. However, this should be mentioned 
clearly at the outset of the report. It should also be 
mentioned that the focus was initially (terms of ref-
erences) on technology push instruments applied to 
the research, development, and early demonstration 
stage of the innovation process; however, this would 
leave out a large number of issues.
The introduction neither makes clear who writes this 
report, in the context of which project (Think, with a 
specific distribution of tasks between the team leader 
and the research group), and whom it is addressed to.
Open Issues / Questions
I have three specific comments
A complex approach which is very generic, with an 
“easy” solution, but a certain disconnect to reality: I 
see a disconnection between the methodological re-
sults, as summarized by Table 2 (“Summary of the 
characteristics of technology push instruments”) and 
the real-existing policy debate. The most elementary 
issue is the lacking link between the derivation of 
the “optimal” financial instruments, and the instru-
http://think.eui.eu64
Final Report - January 2011
ments that are currently discussed both at the EU and 
the MS level. This becomes particularly clear in the 
case study on CCTS (carbon capture, transport, and 
storage), but also in the two other case studies (PV, 
electricity networks). One way out of this would be 
to feed the case studies with the relevant institutional 
details. A decision needs to be made whether the case 
studies should be “generic”, or whether they should 
contain a proper assessment of the real situation by 
the team. The latter case is more demanding, but it 
would also assure a higher impact of the report.
Key Performance Indicators (“KPI”) suggest preci-
sion of decisions, where in many cases there is “grop-
ing around in the dark” (von Mieses): I agree on the 
need of quantitative indicators, here described as Key 
Performance Indicators (“KPI”), Section 4.2 there-
fore logically defines the approach to high-resolution 
KPIs, e.g. in the tendering of projects or programmes, 
and for ex-post control. However, this instrument 
comes at a cost, too, i.e. the defining, monitoring, and 
other transaction costs. For example, the KPIs in the 
CCTS case study are much too detailed to be opera-
tionally applicable.
Another issue on quantification: it is not clear how the 
categories (“low-risk, high-risk”, low cost, potentially 
profitable, etc.) could be operationalized in practice. 
This would require both a quantitative approach, 
such as outline by David Newbery in the annex, and, 
beyond that, a comparative analysis across sectors. 
Thus, the PV-case study could be complemented by 
similar applications to other sectors. Since this is a lot 
of work, one might consider to propose it as a topic of 
Master’s Theses.
Message on IP unclear: It is my understanding that 
public support, in particular through the EU, would 
suggest that IP rights should NOT be privatized, but 
on the contrary rendered public, such that the diffu-
sion of knowledge be accelerated. Evidently, this is in 
contrast with incentives for investors that see appro-
priation as the way to proceed. The report is not clear 
on this issue, and I think there should be a more in-
depth discussion of this issue, with clear-cut recom-
mendations.
Case study on CCTS
I think the case study on CCTS is based on doubt-
ful assumptions, and it does not make clear why 
CCTS really needs substantial public support. The 
assumption is that “The variables characterizing the 
innovation process will influence the choice of sup-
port mechanism. We assume that market conditions 
(critically, the future carbon price) are in place to 
guarantee the uptake of CCS plants once they reach 
maturity.” [p. 29]. If this is the case, then do we need 
additional funding? In addition, there is a strong fo-
cus on capture, whereas transport and storage are 
widely ignored.
In general, I think it is unclear why the assumption 
that we “need” CCTS at all should be adopted without 
further consideration. There is currently a very con-
troversial debate going on, about underestimation of 
costs and overestimation of the flexibility character-
istics of CCTS. To my knowledge, none of the pilot 
projects supported under the European Economic 
Recovery Program (EERP) has advanced sufficiently, 
or has even seriously started. Given the underutili-
zation of public support already provided to CCTS 
projects, in particular at European scale, spending 
further money on high-risk projects, e.g. through al-
location parts of the 300 mn. Certificates from the 
New Entrant Reserve, seems inappropriate. There-
fore, the case study seems quite theoretical, and not 
in tune with real world requirements in this sector.
Project Advisor: Pantelis CAPROS 
Professor at NTUA – E3MLab/ICCS 
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Submission date: October 2010
As one of the scientific advisors to Think on the re-
port “Public Support for the Financing of RD&D 
Activities in New Clean Energy Technologies” I at-
tended the experts meeting on 7 September 2010 and 
the Scientific Committee on 13 October 2010.
Overview of the report
The report addresses the question of which financ-
ing support schemes are more appropriate for RD&D 
activities in new clean energy technologies. The sup-
port schemes are considered from the perspective 
of public policy. The new clean energy technologies 
are assumed to be those included in the EU’s Strate-
gic Energy Technology Plan. The report states that 
the design of public support schemes for financing 
RD&D has to induce socially optimal innovation.
The report concludes that without public financing 
support RD&D undertaking is not likely to deliver 
the targeted technology progress. The reasons men-
tioned include the weakness of the EU ETS price sig-
nal, the public good nature of the clean energy RD&D 
and the high uncertainty surrounding high potential 
return RD&D projects.
The report addresses the issue of RD&D projection 
selection on the basis of four criteria (page 8) by con-
sidering a “social value” of the project as a measure-
ment of performance against all criteria. The report 
provides a calculation example (PV) and states that 
the estimation is difficult and involves many assump-
tions.
The report proposes an assessment of various policy 
instruments for public financing of RD&D against 
different goals aimed by the instruments (Table 2). 
Based on this a policy maker could select which in-
strument is more appropriate for a certain project 
depending on its specific nature. Such application is 
illustrated by studying three cases, namely PV, CCS 
and innovative networks.
Clarity of presentation
The report addresses a certain subset of energy tech-
nologies, which mainly refer to power generation 
clean energy technologies, as listed in Table 1. For 
example, demand-side energy technologies are not 
covered, seemingly because they were not included 
in the terms of reference. This should be made clear 
in the introduction of the report, together with other 
boundary conditions. The introduction could also 
improve by including guidance about what are the 
outputs of the report and their practical usefulness.
The material covered in the two appendices prepared 
by David Newberry is an important contribution and 
deserve to be integrated in the main text of the report. 
The project selection issue and the estimation of so-
cial value are unclear in the main report (section 2.1.2 
is not clear especially the paragraph in the beginning 
of page 11), although quite well elaborated in the PV 
example. Since this is an important component of 
the report’s contribution, it would be of great value if 
the report could elaborate a practical guidance about 
how the social value of a project could be estimated 
in practical terms, instead of just mentioning in the 
conclusions that such a job is difficult.
The part of the report on financing instrument se-
lection is well elaborated. The authors may consider 
moving the fine tuning 4.1 either to an Annex or 
merge with section 3, because of its length which 
makes the report unequally distributed among the 
various topics. 
The part on Key Performance Indicators (4.2) is not 
very clear probably because it mixes KPI for project 
selection and KPI for project monitoring. It is unclear 
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whether the report just repeats commonly used KPIs 
or aims at adding something. If 4.1 merge with sec-
tion 3, then 4.2 should also merge.
Section 4.3 on institutional issues is weak and de-
serves to be expanded, if possible.
Finally, conclusions must expand, become more 
practical in terms of recommendations and explicitly 
address the question posed by the Commission.
Major omissions
The report does not address the issue of distribution 
of financing and support effort between the Com-
munity-wide level and the country level, although it 
is mentioned that the CET requests for major con-
tribution by the Member-States. Even if this request 
seems logical because of the size of the funds to be 
raised, there are risks of adverse effects and distribu-
tional effects from changing the balance between the 
EU-wide and the MS levels. Adverse effects can be 
identified for example for the internal EU market, the 
economies of scale and interoperability performance. 
Adverse distributional effects can be identified for 
example for the weaker and smaller Member-States. 
Questions about how national priorities are recon-
ciled with EU-wide priorities could also be raised.
The report seems not addressing the issue of public 
funding as leverage of private funding. As the report 
over-emphasizes the need of public support for clean 
energy RD&D, it does not elaborate on how and un-
der what conditions the choice of the level of pub-
lic support and the choice of the appropriate policy 
instrument can maximize raising private funds on 
RD&D. For example such a feature is not included in 
Table 2, which is the major report’s output regarding 
choice of policy instruments. It is not mentioned in 
the case studies. Looking at the list of technologies 
of Table 1, one can obviously identify different pos-
sibilities by technology in getting private funding as a 
result of public policy support. The degree of leverag-
ing private funding differ depending on the stage of 
maturity of the technology, the potential dispersion 
of applications and the rate of uncertainty surround-
ing RD&D investment.
Specific Comments
Some of the statements included in the report are 
strong without adding substance to the reasoning. 
Examples are the statements: “research intensity in 
the electricity sector collapsed with the liberalization 
of electricity markets” on page 5; “the implemented 
EU emission trading scheme provides neither a suf-
ficiently high current price nor a credible and ade-
quate future carbon price..”, on page 7; “without fur-
ther public support, the level and timing of private 
investment in the development of new clean energy 
technologies will be socially suboptimal”, on page 7. 
These statements should either be written in a mod-
erate way or be justified with argument elaboration.
The public good nature of clean energy RD&D is jus-
tified in the report on the basis that, as other parts 
of the world also have to decarbonize, keeping strict 
IPR will have adverse effects on the public policy goal 
of global climate change mitigation. However today, 
energy technology innovations are widely diffused, 
through common industrial practices, without re-
moving IPR. The Clean Development Mechanism 
seems to be an effective motivation for technology 
transfer, while keeping IPRs by the original develop-
er of technology. Section 3.1.3 correctly mentions a 
seemingly trade-off between private RD&D motiva-
tion and global climate change actions, but does not 
seem to propose something for solving it.
The degree of uncertainty surrounding capital inten-
sive RD&D activities in clean power generation tech-
nologies, resulting in a gap between private return 
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on capital and a social rate of return, as well as the 
positive externalities of technological progress may 
be sufficient reasons for justifying public support for 
financing RD&D. The weakness of ETS price signals 
may be added as an argument, but even if the signal 
was strong and certain, one could still argue in favor 
of public support. Similarly, the public good nature of 
RD&D could be less emphasized.
ANNEX H: Public Consultation 
Conclusions
Responsible: Serge Galant, Technofi 
Submission date: January 2011
Overall paper background
The report must improve on the following back-
ground issues:
— The 2050 perspectives are being built at EU level 
for a first publication by Spring 2011: so far the 
only building performance and deadlines are 
2020.
— 2050 ambitions can be dangerous: Projections up 
to 2050 might seem interesting from a theoretical 
point of view, but it would most probably be very 
arbitrary and essentially unreliable. Suggesting a 
ranking of projects on the basis of such a biased 
criterion does not seem to be a good idea: it would 
probably encourage project developers to overes-
timate their contribution to 2050 CO2 reductions 
(which can not be measured anyway).
— A SET Plan funding line has been provided at EC 
level, but with no funds allocated. Clearly, the is-
sue of having dedicated SET Plan funds must be 
addressed in the report since it is another option 
to motivate projects with high European added 
value.
— The SET Plan management is provided for by the 
EII teams: suggestions can be made according to 
what EII teams have already published. This is es-
pecially true for the selection criteria of projects. 
— Funding mechanisms must take into account the 
first FP8 trends, which have been described by the 
New Research Commissioner6.
— The SET Plan roadmaps and implementation 
plans have been approved by the EC and Member 
States. Selecting priority actions at the beginning 
of three-year periods means to do it only 3 times 
in the 2010 – 2020 decade. This does not provide 
the flexibility required to ensure a proper imple-
mentation of roadmaps. In order to avoid this 
problem, annual Work Programmes will comple-
ment the Roadmaps’ three-year Implementation 
Plans, so that every year experts in charge of im-
plementing them will have the possibility to iden-
tify in details the actions to be funded (this is what 
is happening for the European Wind Initiative at 
least). This solution will allow a continuous ad-
justment of Roadmaps to ever-changing budget-
ary conditions, to the needs of the industry and to 
the results achieved by relevant R&D projects. 
· The overarching goal of the SET Plan has not been 
enough underlined: it has been designed to in-
crease coordination between EU and MS funding 
for energy research, and to focus it towards a low 
carbon economy based on priorities set by indus-
tries and R and D communities. 
The optimal funding mechanisms for low cabon 
technology development 
The report  suggests to harmonize the funding  ap-
proaches  which is a political task.
Funding instruments are often used for making poli-
cy, gaining publicity by taking a nice picture with the 
developer and being able to claim the success. 
6  Innovation Union COM(2010) 546  
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The main virtue of this report is to underline that 
public grants allocating money to companies is the 
most appropriate mechanisms to support low carbon 
research: loans will restrict players to near to market 
technologies, private equity will impose a clear line 
about a product or a service.
Grants and contracts are by far the preferred policy 
instruments to fund clean energy innovation of any 
type. This is an extremely important point, which 
should be properly understood by public authori-
ties at both EU and national level in order to ensure 
a proper implementation of the SET-Plan. Available 
resources should be directed to low-C R&D projects, 
since climate change represent the most urgent prob-
lem to tackle in this decade.
However, several sections in the report suggest that 
funding will mainly come from Member States and 
private players with a topping from the EC. This is 
clearly not acceptable since this report must empha-
size the role EC money in support of technologies 
that have a high added value content.
Budget constraints should be solved not by reducing 
the budget of Roadmaps, which are needed for their 
implementation but by finding adequate sources of 
funding (e.g. radically increasing funding for low car-
bon energy in the FP8 and use new ETS resources to 
support low-C technologies.
The Japanese example
Nothing is said about Japanese approaches: the “top-
runner” approach where innovation is driven by de-
fining standards, not by exhaustive public support.
The funding of large scale research and demon-
strations using ETS funds
The proposed NER300 process description should 
be improved. The EU emission allowances (EUA) 
are monetised before the award decision for NER300 
projects. Winners know exactly what their subsidy 
will be in Euros, 4 years before they need to begin 
operations. This allows project developers having 
enough time to prepare the projects. The main risk 
with the NER300 instrument lies in the capability to 
meet the scheduled CO2 stored (output-based KPI).
Research funding of regulated operators
A dedicated section is needed in this topic, since 
transmission and distribution of electricity/gas are 
regulated activities. It is therefore needed to define a 
regulatory framework and a financing structure that 
ensures a long-term stable support for innovative 
multi annual projects through recognition in the tar-
iffs of these costs. This is foreseen in the Third Energy 
Package approved by the Parliament and the Council 
in June 2010. Yet, there is a need to accelerate the reg-
ulation implementation at MS level to raise the funds 
for allocation according to RTD roadmap. A dedi-
cated section on the topic introducing the OFGEM 
approach in the UK and the routes for network op-
erators in continental Europe should help in speeding 
up regulatory changes. Likewise, the Italian regulator 
approved an additional 2% WACC on investments re-
lated to Smart Grids and Energy Efficiency Projects. 
Moreover:
— Performance measurement on “enabling” technol-
ogies such as the electric Grid should be handled 
properly. These enabling technologies contrib-
ute only indirectly to the result the community 
is after. Their performance should be measured 
by measuring the progress of the work program, 
the resources used and the new technologies de-
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livered and implemented. It should be explored 
if the hosting capacity of the grid for carbon free 
sources can be measured as well.
— Regulated companies have not the same incen-
tives as the results of their innovation efforts will 
mostly fall to the customers of the network, with-
out benefit to the shareholder of the regulated 
company. As long as this situation persists, Grants 
and R&D Contracts are most suitable instruments 
for regulated players to stimulate innovation.
— The efficiency of the grant awarding process plays 
an important role in the efficiency of the grid in-
novation process. It takes about 1.5 year from Call 
for proposal to the start of the project. in FP7. 
Compared to the time horizon of an EII imple-
mentation plan (3 years) or the duration of a pro-
ject, it is far too long.
Intellectual property rights
This is a very critical issue, for which an analysis of 
FP7 rules (autonomous decision of the consortium 
based on an agreed exploitation plan) brings new 
perspectives and progresses. More attention ought to 
e paid to such rules and their impacts.
Interesting schemes are proposed in the report.  For 
instance:
“In order to motivate efficient and well-directed 
RD&D, IP schemes should in general deliver returns 
to innovators that are largely proportional to the use, 
and therefore the level of success, of the technologies 
they contribute to develop. Hypothetically, clean en-
ergy IPR might provide geographical limitations on 
protected use. Thus, for example, patents issued could 
grant private entrepreneurs and companies exclusive 
rights that only apply to developed countries. In this 
case, developed countries should be able to import 
clean products even when they are subject to patents 
under this limited geographic area restriction. Alter-
natively, a system of royalty payments could be cre-
ated whereby the level of payments depends on the 
country where licensed technologies are used. Both 
a system of geographically differentiated royalty 
payments and one of geographically limited patents 
should probably be complemented by a centrally ad-
ministered fund compensating innovators for fore-
gone revenues in developing countries”
Beware that this might a false “good idea”
If companies should give away IP and / or rights to 
exploit that IP to the poorest countries (LDCs), then
— companies will give away their least valuable IP. It 
might also be of little value to the LDC
— Imagine the LDC benefits from a lot of foreign di-
rect investment from, say,  China, and it is a Chinese 
company that exploits that IP on behalf of the LDC. 
Would the IP-ceding company be content with that 
situation given the potential for the IP which will be 
made relatively easy to diffuse into China? 
This section should send warning signals about IPR 
management, list other experiences like the Spitzen-
cluster Initiative in Germany, for example (“Solarval-
ly mitteldeutschland”). It is advised to use a reference 
case box approach to illustrate the diversity of pos-
sible approaches. 
Assessing available funding options 
Public loans and guarantees must be addressed in a 
more in-depth fashion
— “Loans are less attractive to innovators than subsi-
dies, since the amount of funds obtained must be 
paid back to the investor together with the agreed 
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interest rate”: this is not necessary (see for instance 
http://www.euromoneyenergy.com/EventDocu-
ment.aspx?eventID=1114&DiscussionID=3640&
SpeakerID=3879)
— “due to asymmetry of information, the public ad-
ministration is better informed than private in-
vestors about the risks involved in an innovation 
process” only public administration has a greater 
appetite for risk 
— “If the innovating entity is deemed to be able to 
pay back a loan with a high enough level of cer-
tainty, public loans turn out to be less expensive 
for the tax payer than any other form of direct 
support”. It must be further substantiated, taking 
into account PPEP 
— “Public guarantees for private loans, which involve 
the same allocation of risks as public loans, could 
have a lower public cost than public loans if the 
liquidity of the capital market is sufficiently high. 
In effect, the public sector may be able to borrow 
risky funds at lower cost as it has a wider cost base 
(the entire public budget, a significant fraction of 
GDP) to bear that risk. Against that, it may be less 
well-informed about the real success probability 
and more prone to optimism bias.” This is inco-
herent with the above assertion about asymmetry 
of information. 
Publicly Private Equity partnership
In 2010 the European Investment Bank set up an eq-
uity fund ( so-called “Marguerite fund”) to invest di-
rectly into smart grids and renewable energy projects. 
This is the first time that the EIB is investing in equity 
on its own, without going through other financial 
intermediaries. The expected role and impact of the 
“Marguerite fund” should therefore be mentioned in 
this section of the document
EERA role
The EERA is an alliance aiming at bringing R&D 
institutes resources together for implementing joint 
projects. However, the EERA as such does not con-
tribute to the implementation of SET-Plan industrial 
initiatives, which are different programmes mainly 
led by the industry. EERA and EIIs should therefore 
not be confused. Otherwise the risk is to change the 
nature of industrial initiatives, which should not be 
shaped by R&D institutes (which typically have long-
er term research objectives, not always in line with 
the 2020 horizon of SET-Plan EIIs).
European added value of the projects 
The table below recalls some basic principles.
Occasions when European R&D collaboration is 
worthwhile
— No single country can efficiently complete the 
R&D work on its own because its research 
teams lack crucial expertise that is to be found 
in one or more other European countries.
— A project is too expensive for one Member 
State to tackle alone.
— The collaboration provides an opportunity for 
researchers to pursue an R&D topic that per-
haps is not a national priority but could be-
come important if progress is made in the topic
It is possible also to argue that EU-funding of re-
search is justified by considering the potential results 
of the project.
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Output-related justifications for European R&D 
funding
— A project generates knowledge that is applica-
ble in many Member States.
— A project yields a product, the cost-effective 
manufacture of which requires the involve-
ment of companies in many European different 
countries.
Finally, the added value of EU-level action can be cre-
ated and need not only be an inherent property of the 
research project. For example, the EU can choose to 
fund a particular project in an effort to stop Member 
States from needlessly duplicating R&D work. Espe-
cially in these fiscally austere times, this is a valuable 
service.
Joint programming and funding at SET Plan 
level
The report addresses indirectly the coherence of the 
whole set of initiatives in the SET Plan. 
Joint programming represents one main obstacle 
against the proper implementation of the SET-Plan, 
which needs joint-programming to ensure that its 
budget requirements will be met. European Industrial 
Initiatives team, in charge of creating the conditions 
for this to happen, are and will play a key role to this 
respect.  EII Teams are composed of industry, R&D 
community, EU and antional representatives: their 
role should therefore be mentioned in this document.
The way to increase joint-programming between 
the EU and Member States is to rely on the existing 
EII Teams, not to enhance the role and profile of the 
EERA, which has sometimes different objectives in 
comparison to those of SET-Plan Industrial Initia-
tives.
Suggesting possible reallocation of funds between 
initiatives introduces the needs for funding coher-
ent projects belonging to different initiatives and 
introducing interactions between them to avoid du-
plication of work. So far, it does not seem that fund-
ing reallocation has been allowed for. Moreover, the 
reallocation of public funds among sectors could 
raise distrust and competition among them: indus-
try could become reluctant to invest in new projects. 
Clear rules and arguments defining reallocation will 
minimise uncertainty for investors.
Remain technology neutral in the report 
The report must avoid statements about the perfor-
mance (technological, economic, social) of the poten-
tial solutions, which have been tested in the past or 
are foreseen in the future. The acceptance conditions 
have indeed local features, which may make generic 
statements irrelevant. And public funding rules must 
be technology neutral , while relying on functional 
needs ( like most of the Initiatives have set their R&D 
goals). 
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HOW TO OBTAIN EU PUBLICATIONS
Free publications:
•	 via	EU	Bookshop	(http://bookshop.europa.eu)
•	 at	the	European	Union’s	representations	and	delegations.	You	can	obtain	their	contact	
details	on	the	Internet	(http://ec.europa.eu)	or	by	sending	a	fax	to	+352	2929-42758
Priced publications:
•	 via	EU	Bookshop	(http://bookshop.europa.eu)
Priced subscriptions (e.g. annual series of the Official Journal of the European Union 
and reports of cases before the Court of Justice of the European Union):
•	 via	one	of	the	sales	agents	of	the	Publications	Office	of	the	European	Union	(http://
publications.europa.eu/others/agents/index_en.htm)
Q
M
-3
1-
11
-4
86
-E
N
-N
 
doi:10.2870/34121 
